Monday, December 3, 2007
Tuesday, November 27, 2007
Visual Studies: Re-thinking Art History within an Expanded Field
Keith Moxey’s opening statement characterizes history and aesthetics as the “Scylla and Charybdis” of the historiography of art history. They were 2 sea monsters that threatened Ulysses and his sailors on opposite sides of a narrow sea channel. One would swallow the sea in a treacherous whirlpool, the other had 6 mouths with which to grab and devour whatever came within its reach. Escaping from one meant an encounter with the other. Ulysses was literally between a rock and a hard place. So in art history the pendulum has swung between the extremes of embracing aesthetics at the expense of context and vice versa. We’ve covered this terrain over the course of the semester as it has been reiterated throughout the history of art history whether we label the proponents Aristotle and Plato, Hegel and Kant, Panofsky and Wolfflin, Baxandall and Greenberg, T.J. Clark and Michael Fried.
I agree with Michael Ann Holly who calls herself a historiographer and phenomenologist. She believes that it is in the confrontation between the two that something novel arises. Rethinking the relationship between aesthetics and history, their place in art history and what art history means in our current world has resulted in an expanded field, here labeled visual studies, that encompasses and tames them both.
Within this expanded field the traditional Western grand narrative of art history can no longer assume its superior position. Just as Freud and the patriarchal world he represents was encompassed by Cixous’ “bisexuality” that made it an equal to the female principle, the Western art historical canon becomes just another aesthetic community among many with its own terms of value that are intrinsic to itself but cannot be applied universally to all other aesthetic communities. I agree with Moxey that modernism set up artificial boundaries to keep its own idea of art pure. Now those boundaries have fallen and we see the power relations that guaranteed the dominance of a Western grand narrative. With this knowledge we are freed to redefine basic terms such as aesthetics and history. Holly gives the historian agency (she calls it responsibility) to define and redefine what have been identified as core concepts.
I don’t agree with Holly that research has to strip the object/artwork of its awe. I am not a part of the community of writers within contemporary visual studies to whom she refers. I can only speak from my own experience. In my four short years of researching and writing about the works of Willie Cole I’ve found each new bit of research has only increased my appreciation of his work. Every time I see Household Find hanging on the wall, I am still struck by its sheer physicality. Only now I have more than my initial visceral reaction to rely on. I can describe its formal properties, the context within which it was made, the historical, political, social and economic implications of its creation and am open to the meaning it might have for its viewers whether they ascribe to the traditional Western art historical canon or are part of another geographically and culturally distinct aesthetic community. Each layer of complexity adds immeasureably to the richness of the whole.
Monday, November 26, 2007
Art History & Visual Studies
Before starting this course, I questioned what visual studies had to do with actually interpreting and analyzing an actual art object. But now, as dicussed by MAH, I realize that art history must contain an analysis of aesthetic in relation to historical inquiries into art lead to different interpretations. These interpretations, through time, lead to rejuventation and new knowledge associated with the history of art. However, it seems important to note, according to MC, that these new choices of how to talk about art history and visual studies is the result of an institutional conditioning and education that art historians, critics, and curators have received.
Although critical theories provide new meaning or knowledge to art from different time periods, I think the conclusion by MAH hits the nail on the head. What causes us to write about art? Why do we want to become historians? Why does this matter? For me, it is an aesthetic response that initially gets me excited to know more about an artist, group of artists, etc. Although aesthetics and the associated pleasure and satisfaction received is universal, it is a driving force that triggers an initial response which then leads to a critical response through the incorporation of critical and cultural theories. We cannot escape the universality of Kant because I believe his writings from the Critique and the Power of Judgment contain the origins from which we choose to enter the industry known as art history.
However, as discussed by KM, the field of visual studies allows us to pull back the layers of art in order clearly see the discriminations we make based on aesthetics and look at art as just visual artifacts. As students and historians, I believe that art cannot provide a conclusive definition based solely on aesthetic autonomy but that historians bring to light the claims of these autonomies. In a postmodern world, it may appear that we are lost but it seems the discourse created through postmodernism makes us aware of the knowledge that has been in the shadows for a long time.
In bringing to light the claims of these aesthetic autonomies, it is vital that historians are aware of the historicities of the past in order to make the connection to the present (mentioned by MC). However, the western knowledge that has been associated with Modernism is in confilict with the analysis and interpretation of non-western art. Postcolonialism and globalization are important theories in order to make educated and valuable analyses of non-western art. This brings to light the conversation we had last week at Stanford as to how historians are cornered into being specialists in genres that related to our own social conditions.
I think I have a lot more to learn about theory and I am definitely learning in my research paper how difficult it is to understand one Foucault theory. I did not choose to be an art historian because I love Foucault, Freud, Marx, or the other nutjobs who decided to write these complicated books. It really boils down to aesthetics for me..If the work does not move me visually, I have a hard time making a connection with it. But hopefully, through many sleepless nights in the future, critical theory will help to broaden my appreciation of art without my subjective hegemony of aesthetics.
Although critical theories provide new meaning or knowledge to art from different time periods, I think the conclusion by MAH hits the nail on the head. What causes us to write about art? Why do we want to become historians? Why does this matter? For me, it is an aesthetic response that initially gets me excited to know more about an artist, group of artists, etc. Although aesthetics and the associated pleasure and satisfaction received is universal, it is a driving force that triggers an initial response which then leads to a critical response through the incorporation of critical and cultural theories. We cannot escape the universality of Kant because I believe his writings from the Critique and the Power of Judgment contain the origins from which we choose to enter the industry known as art history.
However, as discussed by KM, the field of visual studies allows us to pull back the layers of art in order clearly see the discriminations we make based on aesthetics and look at art as just visual artifacts. As students and historians, I believe that art cannot provide a conclusive definition based solely on aesthetic autonomy but that historians bring to light the claims of these autonomies. In a postmodern world, it may appear that we are lost but it seems the discourse created through postmodernism makes us aware of the knowledge that has been in the shadows for a long time.
In bringing to light the claims of these aesthetic autonomies, it is vital that historians are aware of the historicities of the past in order to make the connection to the present (mentioned by MC). However, the western knowledge that has been associated with Modernism is in confilict with the analysis and interpretation of non-western art. Postcolonialism and globalization are important theories in order to make educated and valuable analyses of non-western art. This brings to light the conversation we had last week at Stanford as to how historians are cornered into being specialists in genres that related to our own social conditions.
I think I have a lot more to learn about theory and I am definitely learning in my research paper how difficult it is to understand one Foucault theory. I did not choose to be an art historian because I love Foucault, Freud, Marx, or the other nutjobs who decided to write these complicated books. It really boils down to aesthetics for me..If the work does not move me visually, I have a hard time making a connection with it. But hopefully, through many sleepless nights in the future, critical theory will help to broaden my appreciation of art without my subjective hegemony of aesthetics.
A Rant on Aesthetics and History
The concept of changing art history to visual studies or visual culture is a necessary one. In today’s world I would hope that we have become aware enough to realize that there is no one concept of what art is and as a result it is necessary to study any images or objects that might be considered to be within the realm of art (even those objects whose maker does not see as being art). After all, any object has the capacity to inflict an idea or to be a result of a concept or idea relevant to a time and place. This is why I agree that the study of history cannot always be extricated from the study of an object. In fact, I don’t think it ever can – even formalism has a history. Although, Holly ends with the question about the problem of losing the wonder an object can invoke when one writes about it, and this seems a valid reason not to discuss the history of an object. This “conversation” reminded me of when a friend asked me what I could be writing so much about as an art history student. She asked, “I mean, what can you possibly have to say about art besides whether you like it or not?” This question is hilarious to me, but at the same time relates to what Holly is saying when she writes, “I sense that some of contemporary visual studies so willingly seems...to have sacrificed a sense of awe at the power of an overwhelming visual experience...in favor of the ‘political’ connections that lie beneath the surface of this or that representation.” I agree that something is lost in the act of searching for the stuff that lies beneath the aesthetic. Yet, this is one of the things that I love about art history (or visual culture): it isn’t aesthetic history. It is art history, and art history has almost always taken other things into consideration besides the art object itself...things that are dependent on their time of production as well as their time of study. At the very end Holly asks, “Does the act of writing in either art history or visual studies yearn towards a recreation of visual ‘aesthetic’ experience, even if there is little or none there to be found? Is the desire to write about a subject the first ‘aesthetic’ choice? Or does it, rather, lie in our histories?” I think it is both. But, I do think that sometimes too much desire is placed on the histories rather than on the aesthetics (I hope I am understanding her correctly here). But, what can really be done about that? The historian is doomed to think about the history no matter what – they desire to think about the history in terms of phenomenology, sociology, or whatever.
I am also drawn to Moxey’s question: “’What is to be done?’ Are there any principles according to which history is to be told, or should we recognize once and for all that history must depend on the nature of the interpreting subject? If this is indeed the case, then what is to identify history as a genre that would distinguish it from, say, fiction?” This reminded me of an essay by Hayden White called “The Fictions of Factual Representation.” He argues that discoursed of historians and “imaginative” writers overlap so that the reader cannot tell the two apart without knowing their context and the KINDS of truth they deal with. I think that this idea that there are different types of truth is along the lines of what Moxey is asking. If we were to recognize fully that history depends on the interpreting subject where does that leave us? Even if we relied on a very basic retelling of factual events – the events that are chosen become the ones that have relevance and the ones that aren’t chosen get left in the dust. So, what do we have to rely on? Would that leave us to base our truths on only what we perceive to be morality based on religion? That can be dangerous as well. Every object or historical account has to be open to be looked at and interpreted in any way that the viewer/ reader should decide. Having no ideology becomes our ideology. Yet, I don’t think this is happening. We obviously have our (individual) ideologies and our methods of interpretation based on histories and moralities. And these are all valid and we can understand where one another is “coming from.” This is where I think I agree with Moxey. He says, “The value of these [artistic] developments...lies not in replacing one type of history with another, but to complicate and relativize what we once regarded as ‘the’ story.”
I am also drawn to Moxey’s question: “’What is to be done?’ Are there any principles according to which history is to be told, or should we recognize once and for all that history must depend on the nature of the interpreting subject? If this is indeed the case, then what is to identify history as a genre that would distinguish it from, say, fiction?” This reminded me of an essay by Hayden White called “The Fictions of Factual Representation.” He argues that discoursed of historians and “imaginative” writers overlap so that the reader cannot tell the two apart without knowing their context and the KINDS of truth they deal with. I think that this idea that there are different types of truth is along the lines of what Moxey is asking. If we were to recognize fully that history depends on the interpreting subject where does that leave us? Even if we relied on a very basic retelling of factual events – the events that are chosen become the ones that have relevance and the ones that aren’t chosen get left in the dust. So, what do we have to rely on? Would that leave us to base our truths on only what we perceive to be morality based on religion? That can be dangerous as well. Every object or historical account has to be open to be looked at and interpreted in any way that the viewer/ reader should decide. Having no ideology becomes our ideology. Yet, I don’t think this is happening. We obviously have our (individual) ideologies and our methods of interpretation based on histories and moralities. And these are all valid and we can understand where one another is “coming from.” This is where I think I agree with Moxey. He says, “The value of these [artistic] developments...lies not in replacing one type of history with another, but to complicate and relativize what we once regarded as ‘the’ story.”
Yes on Aesthetics
This article was helpful to read because it gave me a better understanding on “dialogue,” and the skill of “inviting” certain critics, philosophers, theorists, etc. in to our papers for support. So, I felt that this reading was especially informative, as well as purposeful and practical.
I really thought that this dialogue tied in great with our conversations at the Cantor last week in the African Art gallery. How do you understand artifacts that are characteristic and representative of certain cultures when they are displayed in a typical art museum? Moxey addresses the monotonous of “cultural” art or artifact exhibitions at the Louvre and its attempt to display “art” from different countries and cultures. Artifacts, like we saw at the Cantor, are displayed behind glass, denying objects of their original, purposeful and specific values. Moxey writes that the art in the Louvre “were reduced to sameness by means of an exhibition policy that implied that they were somehow equivalent to each other.” (86) He does however note that the Louvre was and still is primarily dedicated to western European art, and their attempts to include more “global” art pieces and artifacts may be a new direction for not only the Louvre, but for many major art museums. With globalization, I find it particularly interesting that major museums such as the Louvre, are finding what seems to be a constant pressure to equally represent and display art from different cultures, countries, and genres. However, because older, more famous museums may be better known for displaying specific kinds of art, from say western Europe like the Louvre, they are suddenly faced with the challenge to “globalize.” This challenge causes haste, monotony, and incomplete representations of attempts to display cultural and global art that many museums are criticized for.
I was also really intrigued by the question, “What does aesthetics still mean for art history today?” I think aesthetics are still important for art history because they provide a basis in which to begin looking at art. Aesthetics can help to provide an artist’s intentions or response to an issue, or can serve as examples and models of how to execute techniques. From aesthetics, from the examination of the formal qualities and characteristics of a piece of art, narratives can form and from theses narratives theories can be applied. (This is one of the aspects I am hoping to touch upon in my paper- first, the act of looking at art, the formulation of a narrative in the mind, and then the mind’s ability to connect what it sees with the narrative derived from the work of art, and then ultimately, a piece of art’s ability to convey certain ideologies.) I do not think that art history or visual studies can transcend into a totally new discipline without recognition and taking into consideration, not just aesthetics, but the “old” art history all together. Art history is a discipline that stems from the past and that should not be forgotten. Cheetham says, “We must instill the sense that the past was different, but that our access to it, our writing of it, posits a connection to the present.” (83) It is the changes and interpretations from past ways of looking at art that has allowed present art historians to formulate theories and posit new ways of conceiving art today. So, yes on aesthetics.
I really thought that this dialogue tied in great with our conversations at the Cantor last week in the African Art gallery. How do you understand artifacts that are characteristic and representative of certain cultures when they are displayed in a typical art museum? Moxey addresses the monotonous of “cultural” art or artifact exhibitions at the Louvre and its attempt to display “art” from different countries and cultures. Artifacts, like we saw at the Cantor, are displayed behind glass, denying objects of their original, purposeful and specific values. Moxey writes that the art in the Louvre “were reduced to sameness by means of an exhibition policy that implied that they were somehow equivalent to each other.” (86) He does however note that the Louvre was and still is primarily dedicated to western European art, and their attempts to include more “global” art pieces and artifacts may be a new direction for not only the Louvre, but for many major art museums. With globalization, I find it particularly interesting that major museums such as the Louvre, are finding what seems to be a constant pressure to equally represent and display art from different cultures, countries, and genres. However, because older, more famous museums may be better known for displaying specific kinds of art, from say western Europe like the Louvre, they are suddenly faced with the challenge to “globalize.” This challenge causes haste, monotony, and incomplete representations of attempts to display cultural and global art that many museums are criticized for.
I was also really intrigued by the question, “What does aesthetics still mean for art history today?” I think aesthetics are still important for art history because they provide a basis in which to begin looking at art. Aesthetics can help to provide an artist’s intentions or response to an issue, or can serve as examples and models of how to execute techniques. From aesthetics, from the examination of the formal qualities and characteristics of a piece of art, narratives can form and from theses narratives theories can be applied. (This is one of the aspects I am hoping to touch upon in my paper- first, the act of looking at art, the formulation of a narrative in the mind, and then the mind’s ability to connect what it sees with the narrative derived from the work of art, and then ultimately, a piece of art’s ability to convey certain ideologies.) I do not think that art history or visual studies can transcend into a totally new discipline without recognition and taking into consideration, not just aesthetics, but the “old” art history all together. Art history is a discipline that stems from the past and that should not be forgotten. Cheetham says, “We must instill the sense that the past was different, but that our access to it, our writing of it, posits a connection to the present.” (83) It is the changes and interpretations from past ways of looking at art that has allowed present art historians to formulate theories and posit new ways of conceiving art today. So, yes on aesthetics.
Sunday, November 25, 2007
Visual Studies vs Art History
Art is has entered the post-epistemology stage. Transversing from the so labeled name of Art History and moving to a future of Visual Studies. Pondering questions such as: how might visual studies rethink what we thought we already knew? The keywords to note, and one we just discussed; globalization, visual studies, practices of teaching and research, historiography, cosmopolitanism, aesthetic communities. MC, says that, yes art history is broad, but still limited, and definable. The visual arts/visual culture challenges the traditional modes of assessing the aesthetics. The comment he made about the nature of the 'decision' and how one comes to one's research, made me think about the validity of some of these authors we've been reading. I think it's our programmed Art Historical voice in all of us. Though we should have an open approach to such ideas, abstract writing, calls for abstract thinking/assessing.
MAH, arises the question, do we take the art out of history, or the history out of the art? Why, remove anything, can't they be happily married? I mean, if art could be/is sometimes, called timeless, should we not just appreciate it for the pure aesthetics, and does knowing the 'history' of a work completely change our perspective on the art? From a more contemporary standpoint, we think of some of the famous artists who we have became so enamored with their life profile; they should be in PEOPLE magazine. That could be an example of 'taking the art out of history.'
This one little liners get me, such as 'history must depend on the nature of the interpreting subject.' This makes me think that if art were timeless, every person would view a piece of art in a completely different time, in the context of their contemporary times. Ok, yes this seems obvious, but I want to know what happens when you x-out the interpreting, another impossible notion, is it the same as the saying goes, "If a tree falls in the forest, an no one's around, does it make a sound?" Well, is art, Art if there are no interpreters?
The 'value of value.' Who places the high status on something to enforce the idea of value? Responsible, are they not the historians we have came to praise for their defining of aesthetic value. When MAH, digressed about the past interfering with the present, this makes me think of how we are constantly comparing to what is the art of the moment to the art that has been done. This may be the reason we feel the need to change the title 'Art History' to 'Visual Arts', one is a field of study, the other an intellectual attitude. Saying that we need to move on, forward, and not just dwell in the past, with this past artist, and their artworks. I think we're trying to re-glamoritize art history, be a little avant-garde, it's good.
MAH, arises the question, do we take the art out of history, or the history out of the art? Why, remove anything, can't they be happily married? I mean, if art could be/is sometimes, called timeless, should we not just appreciate it for the pure aesthetics, and does knowing the 'history' of a work completely change our perspective on the art? From a more contemporary standpoint, we think of some of the famous artists who we have became so enamored with their life profile; they should be in PEOPLE magazine. That could be an example of 'taking the art out of history.'
This one little liners get me, such as 'history must depend on the nature of the interpreting subject.' This makes me think that if art were timeless, every person would view a piece of art in a completely different time, in the context of their contemporary times. Ok, yes this seems obvious, but I want to know what happens when you x-out the interpreting, another impossible notion, is it the same as the saying goes, "If a tree falls in the forest, an no one's around, does it make a sound?" Well, is art, Art if there are no interpreters?
The 'value of value.' Who places the high status on something to enforce the idea of value? Responsible, are they not the historians we have came to praise for their defining of aesthetic value. When MAH, digressed about the past interfering with the present, this makes me think of how we are constantly comparing to what is the art of the moment to the art that has been done. This may be the reason we feel the need to change the title 'Art History' to 'Visual Arts', one is a field of study, the other an intellectual attitude. Saying that we need to move on, forward, and not just dwell in the past, with this past artist, and their artworks. I think we're trying to re-glamoritize art history, be a little avant-garde, it's good.
Saturday, November 24, 2007
Discourse in Art History
In a postmodern world, the knowledge of the museum, the academia, and other institutions are considered one branch of knowledge and language. There is no longer a narration that provides any answers or truisms in the art world because we live in a world with too many choices. In the readings this week, I had was more reserved and critical in the authors' knowledge of the museum and art because I realized the text did not encompass a totalitarian viewpoint. This positive truism I was seeking when I originally started my studies in art history is not dead but has never existed from the days of Vasari all the way to the present day.
With the readings of postmodernism in mind, The Postcolonial Constellation article written by Okwui Enzewor seeks to degrade the renewed vision of the Tate Museum in London. Through all of his finger-pointing and critiquing of the Tate continuing to exhibit in a modernist fashion, Enzewor has forgotten where he is received his training within the arts. Being born in Nigeria does not mean that Enzewor's knowledge is composed of eastern or indigeneous thoughts from his native African homeland. In reality, Enzewor has received a Western education that had defined Modernism during the beginning of the Enlightenment. For Enzewor to berate and attack the Tate Museum is to discount his own education. If it was not for the Western thinking and training in which Enzewor was so privileged to receive, he would never have had the ability to write this article, teach at the University of Pittsburgh, and, presently, be the president of the San Francisco Art Institute. Although we need to look at and analyze art outside the scope of art history and into the realm of cultural, political, religious, and social contexts, it is hypocritical for Enzewor to relegate the exhibitioning of art inside the context of the history of art.
On the other hand, I did enjoy Eilean Hopper-Greenhill's article on What is a Museum? as it discusses the knowledge of the museum within the context of art history. Although museum's have contributed to the commodification of the art object, it has created one form of knowledge that has contributed to the public's education of art. The fact that museums are now being critically looked at and studied is now helping to bring to light the fact that the museum is not the absolute ruler in the judgment of art and its histories, but that it is one source of knowledge within the discourses of a postmodern world. However, the general public has been limited by their art historical knowledge because of the hegemony of the museum as the supreme authority figure. The museum, as the Panopticon, has controlled the surveillance and identities of artists within the different movements of art. But as Foucault points out, there is discourse outside of the museum, such as political and cultural contexts, that remove any chance of their being a universal truth being offerned by the museum. We are made aware that knowledge is composed of factors outside the history of art as defined by the museum, curators, and catalogs that attempt to authenticate their knowledge as being on top of the institutional hierarchy. Therefore, we need to continue an institutional critique of the museum until it accepts historical, social, and cultural contexts with an equal status to aesthetics in order to increase knowledge. However, in postmodernism, there is no way to provide the positive truism that aesthetics and connoiseurship seeks to comfortably provide.
With the readings of postmodernism in mind, The Postcolonial Constellation article written by Okwui Enzewor seeks to degrade the renewed vision of the Tate Museum in London. Through all of his finger-pointing and critiquing of the Tate continuing to exhibit in a modernist fashion, Enzewor has forgotten where he is received his training within the arts. Being born in Nigeria does not mean that Enzewor's knowledge is composed of eastern or indigeneous thoughts from his native African homeland. In reality, Enzewor has received a Western education that had defined Modernism during the beginning of the Enlightenment. For Enzewor to berate and attack the Tate Museum is to discount his own education. If it was not for the Western thinking and training in which Enzewor was so privileged to receive, he would never have had the ability to write this article, teach at the University of Pittsburgh, and, presently, be the president of the San Francisco Art Institute. Although we need to look at and analyze art outside the scope of art history and into the realm of cultural, political, religious, and social contexts, it is hypocritical for Enzewor to relegate the exhibitioning of art inside the context of the history of art.
On the other hand, I did enjoy Eilean Hopper-Greenhill's article on What is a Museum? as it discusses the knowledge of the museum within the context of art history. Although museum's have contributed to the commodification of the art object, it has created one form of knowledge that has contributed to the public's education of art. The fact that museums are now being critically looked at and studied is now helping to bring to light the fact that the museum is not the absolute ruler in the judgment of art and its histories, but that it is one source of knowledge within the discourses of a postmodern world. However, the general public has been limited by their art historical knowledge because of the hegemony of the museum as the supreme authority figure. The museum, as the Panopticon, has controlled the surveillance and identities of artists within the different movements of art. But as Foucault points out, there is discourse outside of the museum, such as political and cultural contexts, that remove any chance of their being a universal truth being offerned by the museum. We are made aware that knowledge is composed of factors outside the history of art as defined by the museum, curators, and catalogs that attempt to authenticate their knowledge as being on top of the institutional hierarchy. Therefore, we need to continue an institutional critique of the museum until it accepts historical, social, and cultural contexts with an equal status to aesthetics in order to increase knowledge. However, in postmodernism, there is no way to provide the positive truism that aesthetics and connoiseurship seeks to comfortably provide.
Wednesday, November 21, 2007
Globalization- A New Challenge for Museums
Enwezor writes, “Here, what marks the critical division between culture and art is that for centuries art as such has waged a fierce battle of independence from all cultural, social economic, and political influences.” Battle waged or not, I do not think there is any denying the relationship between art and culture, not even with the apparent tolls of globalization. Art is still produced by someone, or now, something, but there still remains an inspiration or purpose at the root of production. Enwezor then states that contemporary artists today are driven by the “new forms of governmentality and institutions, new domains of living and belonging as people and citizens, cultures and communities, defined by the post-colonial matrix that shapes the ethics of subjectivity and creativity today.” He contrasts this modern notion with that of “classical European thought . . . informed by its own internal cohesion, without an outside.” I would argue that classical Europe was just as driven by “new” forms of government and institutions as is true with today’s contemporary society. Enwezor uses the word “thought,” “classical European thought”- “thought” implies an active process, a reaction to something in which to first have thought about, meaning that there had to be something to react to. I think that classical Europe, although not faced with the exact governments and institutions as we are occasionally burdened with today, had their own burdens in the form of government, which in many cases was the church. The church took the form of both institution and government.
I also have to wonder what the difference is between globalization and imperialism that Enwezor refers to. He writes about globalization after imperialism, and then uses the term “post-imperialism” to define his “postcolonial constellation.” What’s exactly is globalization but another form of imperialism? Another way for powers to influence and push ideas? This may be a bit of a generalization, I realize, but what is the museum but another way in which to attempt to convey ideology and construct history- possibly another form of globalization? With that said, I think that what Enwezor is so enraged about in his article is the Tate Modern’s attempt to categorize and globalize its exhibition of African Art. How do you exhibit something that was not made for the purpose of being art, but made for a specific reason, for a specific task, by a specific culture? Are these objects then considered art? Should they be displayed in an art museum known for modern and contemporary exhibitions? The exhibition is then forced to include text about how the objects were used and what their intended purpose was, turning the museum and the exhibition into the curator’s and/or the museum’s own view or take on the history of a certain culture. It is an attempt in which to globalize and categorize, in this case African objects within the context of a museum, displaying them as art, and constructing a history for an entire "Africa" based on only the objects part of the exhibition. The objects that are purposely left out are just as important, and tell just as much about Britain's own views about colonial history. Obviously, Enwezor feels that the Tate Modern failed miserably and has not moved passed colonialism at all. Once again, it seems as though the history of African cultures are falsely reconstructed and dominated by a powerful institution, the museum. I believe that museums and curators today face a huge challenge during a time with it seems like artists and the world for that matter are fighting against and resisting globalization and the old way of categorization and classification.
I also have to wonder what the difference is between globalization and imperialism that Enwezor refers to. He writes about globalization after imperialism, and then uses the term “post-imperialism” to define his “postcolonial constellation.” What’s exactly is globalization but another form of imperialism? Another way for powers to influence and push ideas? This may be a bit of a generalization, I realize, but what is the museum but another way in which to attempt to convey ideology and construct history- possibly another form of globalization? With that said, I think that what Enwezor is so enraged about in his article is the Tate Modern’s attempt to categorize and globalize its exhibition of African Art. How do you exhibit something that was not made for the purpose of being art, but made for a specific reason, for a specific task, by a specific culture? Are these objects then considered art? Should they be displayed in an art museum known for modern and contemporary exhibitions? The exhibition is then forced to include text about how the objects were used and what their intended purpose was, turning the museum and the exhibition into the curator’s and/or the museum’s own view or take on the history of a certain culture. It is an attempt in which to globalize and categorize, in this case African objects within the context of a museum, displaying them as art, and constructing a history for an entire "Africa" based on only the objects part of the exhibition. The objects that are purposely left out are just as important, and tell just as much about Britain's own views about colonial history. Obviously, Enwezor feels that the Tate Modern failed miserably and has not moved passed colonialism at all. Once again, it seems as though the history of African cultures are falsely reconstructed and dominated by a powerful institution, the museum. I believe that museums and curators today face a huge challenge during a time with it seems like artists and the world for that matter are fighting against and resisting globalization and the old way of categorization and classification.
Tuesday, November 20, 2007
Postcolonialism and the Museum
Enwezor begins with a call for a new and critical look at artistic production and how it relates to the postcolonial global culture that we live in today. But, he also thinks that a look at the artwork itself can give a clearer picture of what our postcolonial world really looks like today than can simply looking at what he calls the “postcolonial constellation.” He says that his article is a response to previous assertions that he made about the content of art being based “around the norms of...postcolonial...forms.” These forms are named as hybridization, creolization, etc., with a cosmopolitan flavor. He also asserts that in order to discuss this art, a discourse has to base itself on modernity and imperialism as well as the postcolonial discourse. He ends the first section by introducing a discussion about the proper role of the curator in our current postcolonial imperialist, modernist based cultural world.
In the next section he begins by talking about the kinds of criticisms on curatorial work today. One is speculative and general and sees contemporary art as a novelty. The second is institutional and is either academic or museological. He says art is scientific and autonomous – not cultural. One of his examples is the appropriation of African sculptures by European artists and a failure to properly and fully address this appropriation. Enwezor contends that the analysis has been largely formal (or scientific).
At this point Enwezor brings in the discourse of Peter Burger who says, “Conceiving of art’s apartness from society as its ‘nature’ means involuntarily adopting the l’art por l’art concept of art and simultaneously making it impossible to explain this apartness as a product of a historical and social development.” I love this “catch 22” aspect that he gives to the formalist approach. Enwezor says this has led to opposing traditions that can be described as the same type of criticism that he calls institutional. Institutional criticism is a domain fought over by traditionalist and progressive groups, who Enwezor says, reject any social function of art. Enwezor gives two examples of this phenomenon; one of which scrutinizes the situation at the Tate Modern. Here the curators had decided to initiate a more dialectical approach to explain the heritage of European modernism, which ends up being troubling rather than “progressive.” Enwezor can only surmise that this failure is due to the Tate’s logical position as the heir to European primitivist discourse.
Enwezor then discusses the ever-multiplying problems of and with museum curatorial work in the postcolonial climate. He then posits that the curatorial response has been to assimilate five historical effects, which are impermanent and contingent. They are the “enlargement” of exhibitions, decolonization and cultural identity, heterogeneity, mediatization of culture, and globalization of economic production and culture.
With all of these in mind, how does the curatorial process work intellectually? The curator has to think within and outside of the canon. Enwezor suggests that it is impossible for the curator to NOT ally himself or herself with the institutionally ordered experience of art. This is true, although in an ideal world people would use their abilities to think and allow for their own discourse of thought with that which the museum sets forth. Enwezor says, “Another way of approaching the discourse on curatorial practice is to understand the work of the curator as a mode of practice that leads to particular ways of aligning thought and vision through the separation and juxtaposition of a number of models within the domains of artistic production and public reception.” Is this not what the artist does? Artists work in a way that lead to particular ways of aligning thought and vision. Often the work of artists is meant to make us think or to portray a particular point of view. Why is it that the curator or the museum must always have this aura of authority? Why can’t they be seen as an extension of the artist in that their work is there to make us think and talk – not to produce yet another master narrative, but rather “continuous redefinitions” to discuss, reject, act upon, accept, etc.?
Vogel’s article was an interesting account of an exhibition that she put together in an attempt to be as idealistic as possible in the representation of African art within the museum setting. I found her methods interesting, but disagreed with many of the things that she said. For example, “If the audience knows one thing about African art, it knows these objects were never meant to be seen in museum buildings.” That may be true, deep down. But, I think that a majority of the public doesn’t even consider the possible uses of the objects it sees in the museum setting. Most people are trained to look at an object and decide whether they like it or not. Not enough people are educated enough about art to truly be discerning about the social history of any object without some explanation.
I enjoyed Bann’s article and particularly that he addressed the fact that the discourse within a mode of display is largely dependent on the system of knowledge within the period in which the display is made. This related very well to Enwezor’s article and his discussion of the modes of display (and discourse within that display) in the postcolonial period. Bann also asks what it means “to see a culture and to understand it by looking at objects.” I think this is an extraordinarily pertinent question, yet almost impossible to answer. All it really means is that we can never get a full view unless we actually live in the moment of those objects – and even then, the experience is entirely subjective.
Eilean Hopper’s article was very clear and practical and offered some valuable insight into the history of museums and the manner in which they have related to systems of knowledge over the years. But, she also talks about how we look at things by trying to show how they are similar rather than different. She offers a doorway to explore how museums might follow a path that differentiates their goals and methods of conceptualizing themselves that can be quite different from how it has been done in the past.
In the next section he begins by talking about the kinds of criticisms on curatorial work today. One is speculative and general and sees contemporary art as a novelty. The second is institutional and is either academic or museological. He says art is scientific and autonomous – not cultural. One of his examples is the appropriation of African sculptures by European artists and a failure to properly and fully address this appropriation. Enwezor contends that the analysis has been largely formal (or scientific).
At this point Enwezor brings in the discourse of Peter Burger who says, “Conceiving of art’s apartness from society as its ‘nature’ means involuntarily adopting the l’art por l’art concept of art and simultaneously making it impossible to explain this apartness as a product of a historical and social development.” I love this “catch 22” aspect that he gives to the formalist approach. Enwezor says this has led to opposing traditions that can be described as the same type of criticism that he calls institutional. Institutional criticism is a domain fought over by traditionalist and progressive groups, who Enwezor says, reject any social function of art. Enwezor gives two examples of this phenomenon; one of which scrutinizes the situation at the Tate Modern. Here the curators had decided to initiate a more dialectical approach to explain the heritage of European modernism, which ends up being troubling rather than “progressive.” Enwezor can only surmise that this failure is due to the Tate’s logical position as the heir to European primitivist discourse.
Enwezor then discusses the ever-multiplying problems of and with museum curatorial work in the postcolonial climate. He then posits that the curatorial response has been to assimilate five historical effects, which are impermanent and contingent. They are the “enlargement” of exhibitions, decolonization and cultural identity, heterogeneity, mediatization of culture, and globalization of economic production and culture.
With all of these in mind, how does the curatorial process work intellectually? The curator has to think within and outside of the canon. Enwezor suggests that it is impossible for the curator to NOT ally himself or herself with the institutionally ordered experience of art. This is true, although in an ideal world people would use their abilities to think and allow for their own discourse of thought with that which the museum sets forth. Enwezor says, “Another way of approaching the discourse on curatorial practice is to understand the work of the curator as a mode of practice that leads to particular ways of aligning thought and vision through the separation and juxtaposition of a number of models within the domains of artistic production and public reception.” Is this not what the artist does? Artists work in a way that lead to particular ways of aligning thought and vision. Often the work of artists is meant to make us think or to portray a particular point of view. Why is it that the curator or the museum must always have this aura of authority? Why can’t they be seen as an extension of the artist in that their work is there to make us think and talk – not to produce yet another master narrative, but rather “continuous redefinitions” to discuss, reject, act upon, accept, etc.?
Vogel’s article was an interesting account of an exhibition that she put together in an attempt to be as idealistic as possible in the representation of African art within the museum setting. I found her methods interesting, but disagreed with many of the things that she said. For example, “If the audience knows one thing about African art, it knows these objects were never meant to be seen in museum buildings.” That may be true, deep down. But, I think that a majority of the public doesn’t even consider the possible uses of the objects it sees in the museum setting. Most people are trained to look at an object and decide whether they like it or not. Not enough people are educated enough about art to truly be discerning about the social history of any object without some explanation.
I enjoyed Bann’s article and particularly that he addressed the fact that the discourse within a mode of display is largely dependent on the system of knowledge within the period in which the display is made. This related very well to Enwezor’s article and his discussion of the modes of display (and discourse within that display) in the postcolonial period. Bann also asks what it means “to see a culture and to understand it by looking at objects.” I think this is an extraordinarily pertinent question, yet almost impossible to answer. All it really means is that we can never get a full view unless we actually live in the moment of those objects – and even then, the experience is entirely subjective.
Eilean Hopper’s article was very clear and practical and offered some valuable insight into the history of museums and the manner in which they have related to systems of knowledge over the years. But, she also talks about how we look at things by trying to show how they are similar rather than different. She offers a doorway to explore how museums might follow a path that differentiates their goals and methods of conceptualizing themselves that can be quite different from how it has been done in the past.
Monday, November 19, 2007
Enwezor's article, "The Postcolonial Constellation: Contemporary Art in a State of Permanent Transition" presents the idea that globalization has rid cultures of their "temporal and spatial distance" and has standardized cultures for the sake of capitalism. Since globalization has blurred the lines between cultures has it done the same for art? He introduces the idea of postcolonial constellation as being a "set of arrangements of deeply entangled relations and forces that are founded by discourses of power. The idea of the globalization of art fundamentaly refutes the traditionalist approach to art history. One thing is not directly leading to another, but instead it is a convergence of ideas and cultures and images that lead to progession of art.
Enwezor discusses the type of commentary that surrounds an exhibition. There are two different types. The first regards the exhibition as a novelty. The critique is sensationalist and treats the exhbition as a type of fashion show in which one is more concerned with whats "new" than with the art itself. The second type of critique is institutional. It revolves around the principle that "art has meaning and cultural value only when it is seen wholly as art and autonomous. That is any encounter with art must relate to that art scientifically, not culturally, in order to understand the objective conditions of the work in question".
Enwezor then goes on to discuss the way in which art is presented to the viewer in museum setting. I don't know that a visitor at a museum would ever stop to think about the way in which the art is presented to him by the curator. The typical viewer would most likely consider the work in and of itself and consider the artist, and although his experience and understanding would certainly be affected by the way the art is presented to him by the curator, he probably wouldnt realize it. In a way Enwezor is examing the extent of the curator's power and the ramifications of it. He says, "...it is of significant interest to see in the curator a figure who has assumed a position as a producer of certain kinds of thought about art, artists, exhibitions, and ideas and their place among a field of other possible forms of thought that govern the transmission and reception of artistic production; to think reflexively also about museums".
Enwezor discusses the type of commentary that surrounds an exhibition. There are two different types. The first regards the exhibition as a novelty. The critique is sensationalist and treats the exhbition as a type of fashion show in which one is more concerned with whats "new" than with the art itself. The second type of critique is institutional. It revolves around the principle that "art has meaning and cultural value only when it is seen wholly as art and autonomous. That is any encounter with art must relate to that art scientifically, not culturally, in order to understand the objective conditions of the work in question".
Enwezor then goes on to discuss the way in which art is presented to the viewer in museum setting. I don't know that a visitor at a museum would ever stop to think about the way in which the art is presented to him by the curator. The typical viewer would most likely consider the work in and of itself and consider the artist, and although his experience and understanding would certainly be affected by the way the art is presented to him by the curator, he probably wouldnt realize it. In a way Enwezor is examing the extent of the curator's power and the ramifications of it. He says, "...it is of significant interest to see in the curator a figure who has assumed a position as a producer of certain kinds of thought about art, artists, exhibitions, and ideas and their place among a field of other possible forms of thought that govern the transmission and reception of artistic production; to think reflexively also about museums".
Tuesday, November 13, 2007
Postmodernism
What is post modernism and how does it reflect art of today? When I was reading the introduction, I began to think of the artwork of Robert Haring and his under movement in art. In addition, I began to think the way that he painted, lived and acted not just as an artist but a human.
When I began to read the article by Lyotard really made me think about who is right and who is wrong. This made me think how not one person and or group is right but the whole idea of different thought make since. I thought that the line what proof is there that my proof is true?” and this to me is what post modernism is all about. Also the idea that when one thought is made not everyone is going to agree with you. For instance, art work many people ask what is it and some historians say art and the you have the dialog back and forth how is it art and finally you say BUT ITS ART!
After reading this whole section, the two articles that I thought were good tool on debate were the first two. I like to think of them as postmodern ideology of what and who we are as a society. Some think that America is like Disneyland however, it is not. We are the exact opposite of what that culture phenomena is all about. These two reading really clarified what is postmodernism and how people look at it.
However, the articles that are post 9/11 resemble how now we look art the society and art as a whole. I think that it is interesting that people did not really know what the twin towers were until after the horrific event. In addition, this brings me back to the whole issue of what is right and what is wrong. How are we to say that art society and life are the right ones and how can we know for a fact that the people who make the discussion for us are a mkeing the right ones. To me post modernism is interesting form of art and society and how the people art out lashing in how we live.
When I began to read the article by Lyotard really made me think about who is right and who is wrong. This made me think how not one person and or group is right but the whole idea of different thought make since. I thought that the line what proof is there that my proof is true?” and this to me is what post modernism is all about. Also the idea that when one thought is made not everyone is going to agree with you. For instance, art work many people ask what is it and some historians say art and the you have the dialog back and forth how is it art and finally you say BUT ITS ART!
After reading this whole section, the two articles that I thought were good tool on debate were the first two. I like to think of them as postmodern ideology of what and who we are as a society. Some think that America is like Disneyland however, it is not. We are the exact opposite of what that culture phenomena is all about. These two reading really clarified what is postmodernism and how people look at it.
However, the articles that are post 9/11 resemble how now we look art the society and art as a whole. I think that it is interesting that people did not really know what the twin towers were until after the horrific event. In addition, this brings me back to the whole issue of what is right and what is wrong. How are we to say that art society and life are the right ones and how can we know for a fact that the people who make the discussion for us are a mkeing the right ones. To me post modernism is interesting form of art and society and how the people art out lashing in how we live.
Posting on Postmodernism
First I would like to begin by giving the basic dictionary definition of Postmodernism in the context of art. It is a late 20th-century style, and conception pertaining to the arts, architecture, and criticism, representing a departure from modernism and at the basis has a general distrust of grandiose theories and ideologies. But since we are reviewing literary critics than we shall look to Lyotard for analysis, and maybe some answers. His argument lays on the grounds (or my perception of it) that through knowledge as the key to ‘freedom’ or rather the ‘emancipation of the people.’ This is the ultimate truth, and as we see on bumper stickers today, ‘Knowledge is Power’ this is what pushes the human race forward. But I’d like to question of what kind of knowledge brings us power? Because what may be taught in schools is utterly useless, due to the fact that many ‘facts’ we learned as children only transform into truths, as we become adults. Lyotard uses science as the rights of passage for individuals to achieve this ultimate goal of liberation, and every person is entitled to this right. We use science as a ‘means to an end’ entrusting that through this method of action we will find the factual truth. But I particularly like how he questions himself by stating, ‘What proof is there that my proof is true?’ I concur; science is nothing more than another act of faith.
The statement above about proof, made me think about how we’ve been continually questioning these theorists on their theories. Such as Fried, and his conclusion on the Burial. But I guess its all just speculative thought; fun to play with in the mind, and without it so would be this course.
Jumping ahead to Derrida, and the meaning of moral and ethical responsibility. I particularly was fond of this one because I am continually questioning where, and how people come up with their morals. Which in most all cases stems from personal religions, and where did these religions come from? Well, people. And who is to say whose morals are better, or more ethically sound. Self-interest is the principle here, and the person that came up with that moral, or whatever had some sort of connection with their own self-interest in mind. I just want to say that within the consideration of morals, we all posses our own, and I don’t think there is one solid answer in the way humans must conduct their business, and I think Derrida stating somewhat the same.
All the readings enticed me, reiterating the way I think about how we function now, and how we functioned in the past, always in a continual path of movement, never quite the same, but always in a constant motion
The statement above about proof, made me think about how we’ve been continually questioning these theorists on their theories. Such as Fried, and his conclusion on the Burial. But I guess its all just speculative thought; fun to play with in the mind, and without it so would be this course.
Jumping ahead to Derrida, and the meaning of moral and ethical responsibility. I particularly was fond of this one because I am continually questioning where, and how people come up with their morals. Which in most all cases stems from personal religions, and where did these religions come from? Well, people. And who is to say whose morals are better, or more ethically sound. Self-interest is the principle here, and the person that came up with that moral, or whatever had some sort of connection with their own self-interest in mind. I just want to say that within the consideration of morals, we all posses our own, and I don’t think there is one solid answer in the way humans must conduct their business, and I think Derrida stating somewhat the same.
All the readings enticed me, reiterating the way I think about how we function now, and how we functioned in the past, always in a continual path of movement, never quite the same, but always in a constant motion
Oh no, it's PoMo
I had been looking forward to this week’s topic because I had first been introduced to PoMo in the Contemporary Issues in Photography class I took a few years ago. However, after reading the chapter and the summaries, I don’t know any more about PoMo than I did last week. Perhaps because the Contemporary Issues class focused on photography, my introduction to PoMo was limited. In that class we discussed appropriation most specifically the work of Sherrie Levine and the concept that “originality is impossible, anyway, given that there is nothing new under the sun. Therefore, invention and uniqueness are no longer essential in making art.” I suppose in some sense, the readings reflect this concept. For Lyotard, the post-industrial world is characterized by the loss of the narrative “which has served to guarantee the truth, or use-value, of knowledge throughout history.” So in essence, what Lyotard is describing is a loss of truth. This leads into the other discussions about truth and reality. The articles that intrigued me the most were the discussions about September 11. Because some of the events were captured on film, they became real to us. Would they have been less real if they had not been televised as they occurred or replayed in a continuous loop? For those of us who watched the events unfold on television, the reality was controlled by those reporting on the events and those individuals themselves became spectators as any informative information was lacking. How would we have reacted to the events if they had not been captured on camera? This discussion makes me wonder about the assassination of JFK. Would we view this event differently if we did not have the Zapruder film which provided us with a vantage point that virtually made us front row witnesses to the assassination? (One of the things that is appears to be missing in the historical recounting of the Kennedy assassination is noting when the film was first made public. Unlike 1963, we live in an age of immediacy which we take for granted.) Well, I seem to be digressing. I am looking forward to class when my classmates can help me get a better understanding of the readings and PoMo.
Monday, November 12, 2007
Postmodernism
I am presenting tomorrow so I will be distributing a handout in at the beginning of class
Looking forward to a class discussion on postmodernism.
Looking forward to a class discussion on postmodernism.
Postmodern Readings
For me, this blog was really difficult in the fact that I have absolutely no idea what to write. Because these writings are written in a postmodern style, everything is already so deconstructed and I feel like there’s nothing left for me to interpret or to rethink other than to rehash what was said. Like always, there were some readings I understood better than others, but even still, I felt like I had no jumping off point or inspiration in which to base a blog. I'll be anxious to here the comments in class.
I’m not sure I understand how the “real” is not in the images of the September 11th attacks that Zizek refers to. Is there no real because it’s symbolic, or are the events so symbolic that they lose the real? I would like to know what the “real” according to Zizek is so I can understand what he is referring to. At first I thought his real were the images of people fleeing from the smoke and debris, or the second plane hitting the WTC, but then he goes on to mention how these images are like those we’ve seen over and over again in Hollywood blockbusters. Does that make them not real? And then my other question is, shouldn’t there be some significance to the real? Zizek for me makes it sound like there’s the real and then there is the significance from the real. One or the other, and the significance experienced from the real is infact not real at all because it is derived from the symbolic of the real. Isn’t the purpose of something being “real” significant, if not significant just for being real?
I did enjoy Baudrillard’s use of semiotics in terms of understanding and deconstructing the War on Terrorism sparred by the events of 9/11 juxtaposed with America and what ideals it claims to withhold and “protect.” America itself is a symbol. It is a symbol for freedom and democracy. However, Baudrillard explains that the War on Terrorism fails to fully signify because it holds the claims that America is good and the “other” is bad, when in fact America is involved in a war at which under other circumstances would probably be opposed to as it is in contrast with its own ideals.
I’m not sure I understand how the “real” is not in the images of the September 11th attacks that Zizek refers to. Is there no real because it’s symbolic, or are the events so symbolic that they lose the real? I would like to know what the “real” according to Zizek is so I can understand what he is referring to. At first I thought his real were the images of people fleeing from the smoke and debris, or the second plane hitting the WTC, but then he goes on to mention how these images are like those we’ve seen over and over again in Hollywood blockbusters. Does that make them not real? And then my other question is, shouldn’t there be some significance to the real? Zizek for me makes it sound like there’s the real and then there is the significance from the real. One or the other, and the significance experienced from the real is infact not real at all because it is derived from the symbolic of the real. Isn’t the purpose of something being “real” significant, if not significant just for being real?
I did enjoy Baudrillard’s use of semiotics in terms of understanding and deconstructing the War on Terrorism sparred by the events of 9/11 juxtaposed with America and what ideals it claims to withhold and “protect.” America itself is a symbol. It is a symbol for freedom and democracy. However, Baudrillard explains that the War on Terrorism fails to fully signify because it holds the claims that America is good and the “other” is bad, when in fact America is involved in a war at which under other circumstances would probably be opposed to as it is in contrast with its own ideals.
Nothing is real and even if something is real, there is no point to it anyway
Lyotard presents us with two versions of narrative legitimation: the narrative of legitimation of freedom (or the autonomy of the will of freedom) and the narrative of legitimation of knowledge. Within the narrative of freedom humanity is the hero and all have the right to science. Within the narrative of knowledge science and other kinds of knowledge exist in and of themselves but speculate on themselves by using previously attained knowledge that also came from themselves. Knowledge here also exists to guide spirituality and morality and become a part of the master narrative or ideology of a society. Lyotard says that today we are in the midst of a narrative of the legitimation of freedom where knowledge comes from humanity and that humanity is perceived as self-managed through its own laws, which are also perceived as just in that the laws governing the people supposedly come from the people. In the narrative of knowledge, knowledge is the subject whereas in the narrative of freedom knowledge is the facilitator of morality and spirituality – at least that is what we believe.
Lyotard begins his second section titled "Delegitimation" with, “In contemporary society and culture...” He already said what is happening today is that we are reviving the legitimation of freedom, so I am a little confused by what he means by contemporary society and culture. Perhaps, this is a hypothetical or where he thinks we are headed. Maybe contemporary society and culture exist alongside of what is happening today ideologically speaking. In the contemporary, the grand narratives are no longer credible due to the techniques and technologies of the second half of the 20th c, which caused society to emphasize how we get somewhere rather than where we are going. The how is based on individual enjoyment of commodity culture. This arose from the rule of the legitimation of knowledge that says that knowledge has to legitimize itself in order to be true. However, the legitimation of knowledge with knowledge results in its ultimate suppression – the knowledge that came before is always undermined by the knowledge that comes after it. In this way knowledge appears to be pre-scientific or a vulgar (Clarke!!) narrative meant to exert control, as it exists in order to guide morality and spirituality. The result is delegitimation. Therefore, all that is left is what has already been established (although this is perceived as being untrue as well) because nothing new can be established. This reminds me of the postmodern as it applies to art in that the “original” as perceived by the modern is no longer possible (and perhaps never was).
Lyotard ends by saying that we are not doomed to becoming barbarians as long as we are mindful that we can only legitimate through linguistics and communication. Thus, we are “safe” as long as a discourse exists.
Yet, in his excerpt from “The Inhuman,” Lyotard refers to the pointlessness of discourse because we are all going to die along with our discourse anyway. But, we are in a sense still “safe” as long as we have our discourse because the discourse is a kind of simulation along with other forms of simulation that exist in order to keep a sense of chaos at bay – or barbaric behavior at bay – “for the benefit of humankind.”
In Baudrillard’s excerpt from Simulations he discusses the lack of “the real” based on the idea that all points of reference that we have to show us what is real, are in themselves unreal. His example is Disneyland. We believe that Disneyland is somehow imaginary in order to believe that the rest of the world is real, when the rest of the world is in fact a simulation. He believes that the children or childishness do not only exist in Disneyland, but are everywhere. This is also obscured by the existence of places like Disneyland because the perception is that these are the places where the childishness occurs – not in the “real” word. Before Baudrillard presents us with his notion of what Disneyland is for, he talks about maps. He says, “it is the difference which forms the poetry of the map and the charm of the territory, the magic of the concept and the charm of the real.” Simulation of the real has led to the disappearance of the real. How sad. Yet, here I am reminded of artists who now use mapping as a method in their art practices. Often, these “maps” occur on the Internet – a product that lends itself to simulation. But, these maps try to uncover what lies beneath the simulations.
Baudrillard’s discussion here is related to his discussion regarding terrorism in which images consume a real event due to the fascination with the image. Here he says that reality and fiction cannot be separated from one another – one depends on the other. In order to be fascinated by the attack, we have to be fascinated with the image. Thus, much in the same way that Disneyland is a tool to make us believe that simulations are real, the images of 9/11 are tools to fascinate us with the reality of the actual event and are a powerful tool, to be used by whomever controls them.
Zizek continues with the discussion of the image as spectacle in relationship to reality in Welcome to the Desert of the Real, a title taken from the film the Matrix where people only live simulated lives. She argues that the explosions were not a reality that broke apart our simulations, but rather that the images and simulations of 9/11 broke apart our reality. This is not to say that what happened wasn’t real, but the images and the spectacle “shattered” our realities. Her point that the images that we saw on 9/11 were in a sense sanitized relative to the images we see of other horrors in other countries was the most interesting. She says that, “the real horror happens there, not here.” The “there” is the realm of the Other in relation to Americans, and therefore somehow doesn’t matter so we can view the atrocities in other countries with more comfort than we would be able to view those occurring here.
Lyotard begins his second section titled "Delegitimation" with, “In contemporary society and culture...” He already said what is happening today is that we are reviving the legitimation of freedom, so I am a little confused by what he means by contemporary society and culture. Perhaps, this is a hypothetical or where he thinks we are headed. Maybe contemporary society and culture exist alongside of what is happening today ideologically speaking. In the contemporary, the grand narratives are no longer credible due to the techniques and technologies of the second half of the 20th c, which caused society to emphasize how we get somewhere rather than where we are going. The how is based on individual enjoyment of commodity culture. This arose from the rule of the legitimation of knowledge that says that knowledge has to legitimize itself in order to be true. However, the legitimation of knowledge with knowledge results in its ultimate suppression – the knowledge that came before is always undermined by the knowledge that comes after it. In this way knowledge appears to be pre-scientific or a vulgar (Clarke!!) narrative meant to exert control, as it exists in order to guide morality and spirituality. The result is delegitimation. Therefore, all that is left is what has already been established (although this is perceived as being untrue as well) because nothing new can be established. This reminds me of the postmodern as it applies to art in that the “original” as perceived by the modern is no longer possible (and perhaps never was).
Lyotard ends by saying that we are not doomed to becoming barbarians as long as we are mindful that we can only legitimate through linguistics and communication. Thus, we are “safe” as long as a discourse exists.
Yet, in his excerpt from “The Inhuman,” Lyotard refers to the pointlessness of discourse because we are all going to die along with our discourse anyway. But, we are in a sense still “safe” as long as we have our discourse because the discourse is a kind of simulation along with other forms of simulation that exist in order to keep a sense of chaos at bay – or barbaric behavior at bay – “for the benefit of humankind.”
In Baudrillard’s excerpt from Simulations he discusses the lack of “the real” based on the idea that all points of reference that we have to show us what is real, are in themselves unreal. His example is Disneyland. We believe that Disneyland is somehow imaginary in order to believe that the rest of the world is real, when the rest of the world is in fact a simulation. He believes that the children or childishness do not only exist in Disneyland, but are everywhere. This is also obscured by the existence of places like Disneyland because the perception is that these are the places where the childishness occurs – not in the “real” word. Before Baudrillard presents us with his notion of what Disneyland is for, he talks about maps. He says, “it is the difference which forms the poetry of the map and the charm of the territory, the magic of the concept and the charm of the real.” Simulation of the real has led to the disappearance of the real. How sad. Yet, here I am reminded of artists who now use mapping as a method in their art practices. Often, these “maps” occur on the Internet – a product that lends itself to simulation. But, these maps try to uncover what lies beneath the simulations.
Baudrillard’s discussion here is related to his discussion regarding terrorism in which images consume a real event due to the fascination with the image. Here he says that reality and fiction cannot be separated from one another – one depends on the other. In order to be fascinated by the attack, we have to be fascinated with the image. Thus, much in the same way that Disneyland is a tool to make us believe that simulations are real, the images of 9/11 are tools to fascinate us with the reality of the actual event and are a powerful tool, to be used by whomever controls them.
Zizek continues with the discussion of the image as spectacle in relationship to reality in Welcome to the Desert of the Real, a title taken from the film the Matrix where people only live simulated lives. She argues that the explosions were not a reality that broke apart our simulations, but rather that the images and simulations of 9/11 broke apart our reality. This is not to say that what happened wasn’t real, but the images and the spectacle “shattered” our realities. Her point that the images that we saw on 9/11 were in a sense sanitized relative to the images we see of other horrors in other countries was the most interesting. She says that, “the real horror happens there, not here.” The “there” is the realm of the Other in relation to Americans, and therefore somehow doesn’t matter so we can view the atrocities in other countries with more comfort than we would be able to view those occurring here.
The Paradox of Postmodernism
In doing the readings this week I’m reminded of my son who as a toddler was fascinated with butterflies. He caught them and tore them apart trying to discover what they were made of and how they worked. He was disappointed when he found no secrets and cried inconsolably when he was unable to put the pieces back together and make them fly again. On the one hand I am mourning for a world where humans believed they could communicate directly with nature and where there were simple overriding narratives that explained the world and one’s place and purpose within it. On the other hand, I think it is good for people previously left out of universal narratives to have a voice and for the underlying and unspoken assumptions behind those discourses to be exposed. I am just afraid that through the constant and unrelenting process of exposing, deconstructing and critiquing, exemplified by this week’s readings, that I’ll end up like my son, inconsolable if I am unable to mentally put the parts back together again and get on with life.
Lyotard tells us that the postmodern condition is one without an overriding narrative. There is no single story that makes sense of the value of knowledge throughout history, whether it is a political story of emancipation of the people through scientific knowledge, or a philosophical one where knowledge is an end in itself.
Baudrillard says we are so far from reality that we have created a hyperreality instead, a third level simulation in which any reference to “reality” has been replaced with signs. In “Theory for Art History,” Jae Emerling defines a 1st level simulacrum (an image or representation of something) as something that masks reality like Baroque art that valued artifice over realism. Second order simulacra appeared in the modern age of mass production. In postmodernity, 3rd level simulations appear that have no intrinsic or causal connection with what was previously considered to be reality. The simulacrum supercedes the real so that we live in a world of representations of representations (89). Baudrillard cites Disneyland as an example. Interestingly, although Disneyland is based on the founder’s memory of the small town of his childhood, Marcelina Missouri, Salvador Dali was actually important in its creation. It is a constructed space of social control meant to teach American values in which the past is presented as fantasy. Baudrillard goes so far as to say that Disneyland is the “real” America. Its presence conceals the fact that what is outside its gates is in fact a simulation and is not “real” at all.
Lyotard in “The Inhuman” presents us with a real event beyond human intervention, thought and control. The explosion of the sun would end life as we know it and would thus make all other discussions moot. So how do we deal with this eventuality? Do we ignore it and continue to live our human-centered lives of the mind and the body or do we plan for an unknowable and unforeseeable future in which the systems we have created allow “thought” to remain possible after a disaster that destroys humans?
Lyotard introduces the word sublation. “There is no sublation, no deferral if nothing survives” (222). Sublation means to destroy and to preserve. It unites something with its opposite. This term is instructive in understanding Derrida’s essay on “The Gift of Death.” Derrida introduces another unthinkable situation: that of a father, Abraham, who would sacrifice Isaac his irreplaceable and beloved son to God because he is asked to do so without explanation. He would do it keeping his intentions a secret to prove his absolute duty to God. Derrida describes is as an aporia, a paradox that unites binary opposites. In the instant that the act would occur, the boundary between love and hate dissolves. Abraham’s love for his son becomes hate allowing the act to occur although the character of love never wavers. The gift to God loses its reciprocity. Abraham expects nothing in return for this sacrifice. Duty, responsibility and human ethics are all transcended. Derrida ends by saying: ”An infanticide father who hides what he going to do from his son and his family without knowing why, what could be more abominable, what mystery… more frightful… vis-Ã -vis love, humanity, the family, or morality?” The paradox is how to act morally, ethically, responsibly, without self-interest in relation to the Other (here God) within a Hegelian and Kierkegaardian system. Perhaps it is an impossibility.
Baudrillard and Zizek discuss another unthinkable situation, the bombing of the Twin Towers on 9/11/2001. For Baudrillard it is the impact of the images of 9/11 that we retain. Although the destruction of the Twin Towers was unimaginable, that was not enough to make it “real.” Although it created havoc and destruction, Baudrillard sees it as a symbolic act. (Are we back to Lacan’s Real, Imaginary and Symbolic?) Its repercussions are that the distinction between the crime and crackdown has disappeared. He says the Western ideology of freedom has been replaced with police state globalization, law and order measures that the US and others are implementing, internalizing their own defeat in the name of security. He sees no remedy. The war on terrorism and conventional warfare are rhetorical rehashings of the past. Zizek calls the repetition of 9/11 images “jouissance” beyond the pleasure principle. The real has been emptied from these iconic symbols. We have seen them so many times before in movies. Your worst nightmare, envisioned through the cinema has come to pass in New York so we look to Hollywood (part of Althusser’s ISA, ideological state apparatus) to know how to deal with it. With 9/11 reality was not shattered by the image. Instead the image shattered our fiction of reality. Welcome to “The Matrix” and the desert of the real.
Lyotard tells us that the postmodern condition is one without an overriding narrative. There is no single story that makes sense of the value of knowledge throughout history, whether it is a political story of emancipation of the people through scientific knowledge, or a philosophical one where knowledge is an end in itself.
Baudrillard says we are so far from reality that we have created a hyperreality instead, a third level simulation in which any reference to “reality” has been replaced with signs. In “Theory for Art History,” Jae Emerling defines a 1st level simulacrum (an image or representation of something) as something that masks reality like Baroque art that valued artifice over realism. Second order simulacra appeared in the modern age of mass production. In postmodernity, 3rd level simulations appear that have no intrinsic or causal connection with what was previously considered to be reality. The simulacrum supercedes the real so that we live in a world of representations of representations (89). Baudrillard cites Disneyland as an example. Interestingly, although Disneyland is based on the founder’s memory of the small town of his childhood, Marcelina Missouri, Salvador Dali was actually important in its creation. It is a constructed space of social control meant to teach American values in which the past is presented as fantasy. Baudrillard goes so far as to say that Disneyland is the “real” America. Its presence conceals the fact that what is outside its gates is in fact a simulation and is not “real” at all.
Lyotard in “The Inhuman” presents us with a real event beyond human intervention, thought and control. The explosion of the sun would end life as we know it and would thus make all other discussions moot. So how do we deal with this eventuality? Do we ignore it and continue to live our human-centered lives of the mind and the body or do we plan for an unknowable and unforeseeable future in which the systems we have created allow “thought” to remain possible after a disaster that destroys humans?
Lyotard introduces the word sublation. “There is no sublation, no deferral if nothing survives” (222). Sublation means to destroy and to preserve. It unites something with its opposite. This term is instructive in understanding Derrida’s essay on “The Gift of Death.” Derrida introduces another unthinkable situation: that of a father, Abraham, who would sacrifice Isaac his irreplaceable and beloved son to God because he is asked to do so without explanation. He would do it keeping his intentions a secret to prove his absolute duty to God. Derrida describes is as an aporia, a paradox that unites binary opposites. In the instant that the act would occur, the boundary between love and hate dissolves. Abraham’s love for his son becomes hate allowing the act to occur although the character of love never wavers. The gift to God loses its reciprocity. Abraham expects nothing in return for this sacrifice. Duty, responsibility and human ethics are all transcended. Derrida ends by saying: ”An infanticide father who hides what he going to do from his son and his family without knowing why, what could be more abominable, what mystery… more frightful… vis-Ã -vis love, humanity, the family, or morality?” The paradox is how to act morally, ethically, responsibly, without self-interest in relation to the Other (here God) within a Hegelian and Kierkegaardian system. Perhaps it is an impossibility.
Baudrillard and Zizek discuss another unthinkable situation, the bombing of the Twin Towers on 9/11/2001. For Baudrillard it is the impact of the images of 9/11 that we retain. Although the destruction of the Twin Towers was unimaginable, that was not enough to make it “real.” Although it created havoc and destruction, Baudrillard sees it as a symbolic act. (Are we back to Lacan’s Real, Imaginary and Symbolic?) Its repercussions are that the distinction between the crime and crackdown has disappeared. He says the Western ideology of freedom has been replaced with police state globalization, law and order measures that the US and others are implementing, internalizing their own defeat in the name of security. He sees no remedy. The war on terrorism and conventional warfare are rhetorical rehashings of the past. Zizek calls the repetition of 9/11 images “jouissance” beyond the pleasure principle. The real has been emptied from these iconic symbols. We have seen them so many times before in movies. Your worst nightmare, envisioned through the cinema has come to pass in New York so we look to Hollywood (part of Althusser’s ISA, ideological state apparatus) to know how to deal with it. With 9/11 reality was not shattered by the image. Instead the image shattered our fiction of reality. Welcome to “The Matrix” and the desert of the real.
Monday, November 5, 2007
Saturday, November 3, 2007
Diane Arbus: Justified Criticism or Just A Matter of Discomfort?
I am planning to explore why the work of Diane Arbus is criticized while similar work by Diego Velazquez is characterized as sensitive. I believe that Arbus’ work is criticized because it stirs up a level of discomfort. This paper will give me an opportunity to further explore the idea of self, the gaze, and otherness. Now if I could just find the actual criticism of Arbus’ work and not just mention of it!
Wednesday, October 31, 2007
Fried and Formalism
I found this to be a refreshing article in light of most of the art historical texts we have read this semester. This text combined introduced, accepted, as well as challenged, the ideological socio-political argument T.J. Clark had made of The Burial at Ornans. Then, Fried proceeded in an in-depth argument of two separate beholders of the painting. One is the tout court and the other is a specific spectator to the left side of the painting. I have to admit that I was more influenced by the tout court analysis as I felt that myself, as a spectator, were situated within the grave. However, if I was standing in front of the 22 ft x 9 ft painting I believe my belief as to whether the beholder was in the center could be challened and I might feel that there is an outside spectator to the left.
However, I did enjoy the Vasarian-style analysis of the non-illusionistic quality of The Burial of Ornans vs the illusionistic, chiaroscuro quality of the Carravagio painting Supper at Emmaus. Because the grave portrays a minimalistic, suppressive illusion, its gives the effect, for me, of being Realistic. And this suppression of illusion is shown within the non-Romanticized landscape in the background of the painting. This suppression of illusion is what I feel is most important to Realism's formal qualities in terms of usage of light in paintings by Courbet. The range of light is compressed to devoid the emotional response of the tout court or the outside spectator that was triggered by Romantics such as David Casper Friedrich. It is kind of ironic to believe that illusion=distance and realism=proxmity as most people link romanticism with the inner spiritual and realism with reality. If I was to be in the "subjectivity camp", how would I not be able to defend that illusion=proximity and realism=distance????
Throughout the text, Fried contradicts himself by validating his first theory of the painter-beholder and the outside spectator to the left of the canvas based upon various assumptions such as the skewed orientantion of the open grave and the figure with the crucifix looking gazing outside the canvas. But I believe the multiple analyses are valid because it challenges whether this is a window onto reality or a flat surface facing the beholder. In doing so, we are subjected by the gaze of being looked at, situated within the grave, and as neither within the grave or being looked at because the left side of the painting contains figures that gazes outside of our view.
Lastly, I enjoyed the debate at the end of class yesterday. I think that we are all maturing in our belief systems and representations in our desire to be art historians. But I believe that HISTORY is very important and that it should never be forgotten. It can be valid to use that HISTORY as evidence to support a critical analysis of an art show such as the Jeff Wall show at SFMOMA or any other contemporary arts exhibition within the SF Bay Area museums.
See y'all next week. Ciao.
However, I did enjoy the Vasarian-style analysis of the non-illusionistic quality of The Burial of Ornans vs the illusionistic, chiaroscuro quality of the Carravagio painting Supper at Emmaus. Because the grave portrays a minimalistic, suppressive illusion, its gives the effect, for me, of being Realistic. And this suppression of illusion is shown within the non-Romanticized landscape in the background of the painting. This suppression of illusion is what I feel is most important to Realism's formal qualities in terms of usage of light in paintings by Courbet. The range of light is compressed to devoid the emotional response of the tout court or the outside spectator that was triggered by Romantics such as David Casper Friedrich. It is kind of ironic to believe that illusion=distance and realism=proxmity as most people link romanticism with the inner spiritual and realism with reality. If I was to be in the "subjectivity camp", how would I not be able to defend that illusion=proximity and realism=distance????
Throughout the text, Fried contradicts himself by validating his first theory of the painter-beholder and the outside spectator to the left of the canvas based upon various assumptions such as the skewed orientantion of the open grave and the figure with the crucifix looking gazing outside the canvas. But I believe the multiple analyses are valid because it challenges whether this is a window onto reality or a flat surface facing the beholder. In doing so, we are subjected by the gaze of being looked at, situated within the grave, and as neither within the grave or being looked at because the left side of the painting contains figures that gazes outside of our view.
Lastly, I enjoyed the debate at the end of class yesterday. I think that we are all maturing in our belief systems and representations in our desire to be art historians. But I believe that HISTORY is very important and that it should never be forgotten. It can be valid to use that HISTORY as evidence to support a critical analysis of an art show such as the Jeff Wall show at SFMOMA or any other contemporary arts exhibition within the SF Bay Area museums.
See y'all next week. Ciao.
Tuesday, October 30, 2007
The Serpentine Tool
I just loved this essay by Michael Fried about Courbet in which he methodically deconstructs Burial at Ornans in order to show Courbet’s intended placement of the beholder painter or beholder toute court. The parallels that Fried draws between Courbet’s elements of serpentine lines in his landscapes and group portraits are interesting in that by way of a formal analysis they point to sociopolitical ideas as laid out by TJ Clarke, but also the painter’s relationship to other people including himself and the viewer – even us right now. Not only does the serpentine line represent something larger, but so do the aggressive use of paint and the use of a lack of color.
Fried begins by explaining previous arguments that have been accepted as deconstructions of the painting. The first is Linda Nochlin’s argument that the additive organization of the painting offers a sense of egalitarianism and that it is a painting of the everyday. The second argument is in regards to the sources that Courbet may have used or referred to. The third is an assumption based on Courbet’s relationship to Champfleury that the black clothing represents universal equality in that everyone is “celebrating some funeral.” But, Fried thinks that it has more to do with a particular “Parisian milieu.” The final argument was posited by our favorite TJ Clarke who said that the painting is related to the social and political events that unfolded during the years of 1848 – 51. In the end Fried points out that his own deconstruction does not refute Clarke’s argument, but can coexist alongside it.
Fried argues with Nochlin’s approach of seeing the additive formula as egalitarian by pointing to the individual portraits within the painting. Rather the additive construction and Serpentine-like construction allows for the lines back and forth across the picture plane that Courbet supposedly wants us to notice to bring an awareness that the painter and the viewer exist. Fried solidifies this argument by pointing to Courbet’s use of the serpentine in his landscapes and the ways in which they lead the viewer around the picture plane so that the viewer is in the painting. This is what I consider to be the most beautiful part of Fried’s account. That is his description of the imagined lines of vision across the picture plane and how they relate back and forth from the procession, to certain people within the painting (especially Buchon, the crucifix bearer, and the young boy with the vessel), to the grave, to the beholder and then again to the beholder toute court. The dip that occurs in the drawing and a bit less so in the painting draws the beholder’s eye directly to that space exactly in the same way that the dip in a valley would. All of this “affirms Courbet’s determination to affirm his (as well as the viewer’s) active presence...in the scene of representation.”
And Courbet did all of this in order to remove the previous fashion of the theatrical. But, isn’t all of this theater in a sense? Regardless of whether the viewer is in or out of the painting, there is a certain drama to the painting. The placement of the grave solidifies this. The beholder, whoever they are almost certainly imagines their self being beckoned into this grave. One wonders if Courbet is not calling to a very specific viewer to imagine himself or herself in this grave? Perhaps TJ Clarke touches more upon this idea by relating it to the political. After all, he has been described as one who “relished scandal as a shortcut to prominence.” (quote taken from New Yorker, July 30, 2007)
Fried begins by explaining previous arguments that have been accepted as deconstructions of the painting. The first is Linda Nochlin’s argument that the additive organization of the painting offers a sense of egalitarianism and that it is a painting of the everyday. The second argument is in regards to the sources that Courbet may have used or referred to. The third is an assumption based on Courbet’s relationship to Champfleury that the black clothing represents universal equality in that everyone is “celebrating some funeral.” But, Fried thinks that it has more to do with a particular “Parisian milieu.” The final argument was posited by our favorite TJ Clarke who said that the painting is related to the social and political events that unfolded during the years of 1848 – 51. In the end Fried points out that his own deconstruction does not refute Clarke’s argument, but can coexist alongside it.
Fried argues with Nochlin’s approach of seeing the additive formula as egalitarian by pointing to the individual portraits within the painting. Rather the additive construction and Serpentine-like construction allows for the lines back and forth across the picture plane that Courbet supposedly wants us to notice to bring an awareness that the painter and the viewer exist. Fried solidifies this argument by pointing to Courbet’s use of the serpentine in his landscapes and the ways in which they lead the viewer around the picture plane so that the viewer is in the painting. This is what I consider to be the most beautiful part of Fried’s account. That is his description of the imagined lines of vision across the picture plane and how they relate back and forth from the procession, to certain people within the painting (especially Buchon, the crucifix bearer, and the young boy with the vessel), to the grave, to the beholder and then again to the beholder toute court. The dip that occurs in the drawing and a bit less so in the painting draws the beholder’s eye directly to that space exactly in the same way that the dip in a valley would. All of this “affirms Courbet’s determination to affirm his (as well as the viewer’s) active presence...in the scene of representation.”
And Courbet did all of this in order to remove the previous fashion of the theatrical. But, isn’t all of this theater in a sense? Regardless of whether the viewer is in or out of the painting, there is a certain drama to the painting. The placement of the grave solidifies this. The beholder, whoever they are almost certainly imagines their self being beckoned into this grave. One wonders if Courbet is not calling to a very specific viewer to imagine himself or herself in this grave? Perhaps TJ Clarke touches more upon this idea by relating it to the political. After all, he has been described as one who “relished scandal as a shortcut to prominence.” (quote taken from New Yorker, July 30, 2007)
Fried
Courbet is most likely the most influential realist painter during this time period. Realism demanded that artist to be of their time and to portray contemporary life. Courbet grew up in the rural city of Ornans, France and was the son of a wealthy framer.
It was not until the year of 1848 that Courbet became a well-known painter and actually “existed”. The painting After Dinner at Ornans won Courbet many awards and became a household name. During the summer of 1848 and 1849 Courbet went back home and began to paint three painting that would change the art world forever. The two that Fried discusses are the Stonebreakers and Burial at Ornans, these two painting are true to the realist form that capture the essence of contemporary life in the mid 19th century.
These two paintings are life size and like Courbet himself are in your face with the problems of that many people in rural area of France and maybe all over Europe. Michael Fried talks in his paper how and why these two paintings change the way we look at life in the mid 19th century. He also threw in other art historian’s ideas about how and why these two paintings are truly realist.
These two paintings are of life size and actually maybe even bigger in some instances. The Burial at Ornans is of an event that is about to take place. The essay talks about four curxs that this painting covers.
1) The burial is a break threw painting as a group with and exemplifying and additive mode of composition.
2) This painting is similar to that of the 17th century Dutch master that Courbet most likely saw in Amsterdam. And the colors are most like that of Velasquez. In the year of 1851 about three years after this painting was finished thought that this painting was supplicated and finds that it is the same art as naïve art.
3) That the black is representing of the total bourgeois and is the dress of contemporary life.
4) TJ Clark thinks that Courbet’s family emphasizes the status between the peasantry and the rural bourgeois. The prime subject matter is that of rural France.
Fried talks about the early works of Courbet and his landscapes, which helped him form this painting of the burial, is similar to that of the other landscapes. The composition is which had to be worked on over and over again is of the kneeling boy and that of the open hole.
Fried has four last points that
1) The skewed orientation with the open grave.
2) The people seem to looking at the viewer in the picture plane.
3) The young boy looks similar to that of the young boy in the painting Stonebreakers.
4) Is that the vantage point is front of the cleft or the fold is in the some sense that of prilivaged
Fred wraps everything up with that the close distance between painting and that of the painter seems to work very well with one another.
It was not until the year of 1848 that Courbet became a well-known painter and actually “existed”. The painting After Dinner at Ornans won Courbet many awards and became a household name. During the summer of 1848 and 1849 Courbet went back home and began to paint three painting that would change the art world forever. The two that Fried discusses are the Stonebreakers and Burial at Ornans, these two painting are true to the realist form that capture the essence of contemporary life in the mid 19th century.
These two paintings are life size and like Courbet himself are in your face with the problems of that many people in rural area of France and maybe all over Europe. Michael Fried talks in his paper how and why these two paintings change the way we look at life in the mid 19th century. He also threw in other art historian’s ideas about how and why these two paintings are truly realist.
These two paintings are of life size and actually maybe even bigger in some instances. The Burial at Ornans is of an event that is about to take place. The essay talks about four curxs that this painting covers.
1) The burial is a break threw painting as a group with and exemplifying and additive mode of composition.
2) This painting is similar to that of the 17th century Dutch master that Courbet most likely saw in Amsterdam. And the colors are most like that of Velasquez. In the year of 1851 about three years after this painting was finished thought that this painting was supplicated and finds that it is the same art as naïve art.
3) That the black is representing of the total bourgeois and is the dress of contemporary life.
4) TJ Clark thinks that Courbet’s family emphasizes the status between the peasantry and the rural bourgeois. The prime subject matter is that of rural France.
Fried talks about the early works of Courbet and his landscapes, which helped him form this painting of the burial, is similar to that of the other landscapes. The composition is which had to be worked on over and over again is of the kneeling boy and that of the open hole.
Fried has four last points that
1) The skewed orientation with the open grave.
2) The people seem to looking at the viewer in the picture plane.
3) The young boy looks similar to that of the young boy in the painting Stonebreakers.
4) Is that the vantage point is front of the cleft or the fold is in the some sense that of prilivaged
Fred wraps everything up with that the close distance between painting and that of the painter seems to work very well with one another.
In Michael Fried's "The Structure of Beholding in Courbet's Burial at Ornans" he discusses the relationship between the painting and the beholder that is presented in the work. He mentions that Courbet is attempting something new as most works of that time attempt to exclude the viewer. This relationship between the beholder and the painting is emphasized by the lifesize scale of the work. The crowded of the figures demands our attention and conveys a sense of confrontation.
Fried discusses four points about the painting that are typically accepted theories. The first is that the painting has an additive composition that is based on juxtaposition. Next he says that the composition of the painting is usually attributed to influence from Dutch group portraits, 17th century Spanish painting, or 1830's woodcuts. He mentions the black costumes of all the figures as being thought of as a representation of the borgeoisie, and that it represents the ambiguos social situation between the peasantry and upper class.
Fried then moves on to discuss his own thoughts on Burial at Ornans. He denies that the composistion is purely additive and says it is processional. The overall scene implies a slow continuous movement. This processional composition is emphasized by the wide format of the space. And the mass of black contributes by creating a collective dift throughout. I think Fried's article is well organized and easy to read. He explains all aspects of the painting well and the different ideas about it that exist before presenting his own.
Fried discusses four points about the painting that are typically accepted theories. The first is that the painting has an additive composition that is based on juxtaposition. Next he says that the composition of the painting is usually attributed to influence from Dutch group portraits, 17th century Spanish painting, or 1830's woodcuts. He mentions the black costumes of all the figures as being thought of as a representation of the borgeoisie, and that it represents the ambiguos social situation between the peasantry and upper class.
Fried then moves on to discuss his own thoughts on Burial at Ornans. He denies that the composistion is purely additive and says it is processional. The overall scene implies a slow continuous movement. This processional composition is emphasized by the wide format of the space. And the mass of black contributes by creating a collective dift throughout. I think Fried's article is well organized and easy to read. He explains all aspects of the painting well and the different ideas about it that exist before presenting his own.
Fried's Objecthood...
Wow, were actually reading about art! Adding in some formal analysis and we’ve got an art class back. I was/am a little lost because we’re not so direct this week, like subjectivity or semiotics, but I’m presuming that Fried interest is primarily in the relationship from viewer to the object being viewed. He says all paintings face their beholder. Expressing his view that because the artist expressed himself through the painting, it is now in concrete form, therefore more real than before. If I am getting his point straight, then I can concur with this theory, and one could say not for all art, but I think it’s true. No matter the object of reproduction in an artistic way, the artists is still going to make very specific markings only distinct to that person. He jumps right into the paintings within the first paragraph, and does a well job at explaining them in a not so dry tone. Painted between 1848-1850, he provides briefly all summaries of four different paintings, but focuses his analysis on only one, Burial at Ornan’s. Perceived by generations of historians, about the overall stylistic character of the Burial, all have emphasized its effects of brute material, both as representation and as artifact.
Saying that there is an aggressive presence of the personages, due to the aggressive presence of the paint. Also stating that the people in the paintings are nothing, but elements on the canvas. This essay was well written except for the fact that I didn’t get a clear sense what Fried was trying to prove. I felt he had a huge sales pitch to throughout there, unclear about his reference to Manet, Seurat, and Picasso following Courbet’s initiative. I’m sorry I just felt a little bored reading through this piece, even though it was much clearer than some of the other works, maybe it’s realism that puts me to sleep, I hope our class discussion can boast my interests.
Saying that there is an aggressive presence of the personages, due to the aggressive presence of the paint. Also stating that the people in the paintings are nothing, but elements on the canvas. This essay was well written except for the fact that I didn’t get a clear sense what Fried was trying to prove. I felt he had a huge sales pitch to throughout there, unclear about his reference to Manet, Seurat, and Picasso following Courbet’s initiative. I’m sorry I just felt a little bored reading through this piece, even though it was much clearer than some of the other works, maybe it’s realism that puts me to sleep, I hope our class discussion can boast my interests.
Fried and the Beholder
Michael Fried provides several theories on Courbet’s Burial at Ornans that differ from earlier discourses. I enjoyed Fried’s writing style because he told us what he was going discuss and how he was going to get there. He even warned us when he was straying away from his point and then let us know when he was back on course. Fried does a nice job of leading us into his theories by first providing us with some background information on the four major paintings Courbet completed between 1848 and 1850, two of which Fried has already written about extensively. Fried also provides brief summaries of previous discussions about the Burial and the four major theories posited (1) the additive composition, (2) sources from Dutch paintings or French woodcuts, (3) the black attire and what it represents, and (4) the social and political connotations.
Fried spends a considerable amount of time on the procession and its movement from left to right and back to the left. Fried looks at Courbet’s earlier works and notes Courbet’s tendency to use an S-shaped flow in his landscape paintings. Fried also shows us how Nadar’s Demenagement de l’Assemmblee constituante and Bertall’s Le Jubile des culottes de peau may have inspired Courbet’s procession. (I find these two examples the most intriguing part of this discussion.)
Getting to the main point of the article, Fried is concerned with the concept of the beholder and where exactly the beholder is situated in regards to the scene. For Fried, there are two beholders, the painter-beholder and the beholder tout court and both are part of the painting. Fried discusses at length the depiction of the grave and its location at the bottom of the painting. He suggests that one of the beholders is standing at the unseen side of the grave. Fried also discusses the outward glaze of the crufix-bearer, Colard, and suggests that Colard is staring out at another beholder. Fried goes on to suggest that the gaze is not returned by the beholder and instead is drawn to the hatless figure in profile behind and to the left of Colard. This figure has been identified as one of Courbet’s friends, Buchon. Fried then goes out on a limb and theorizes that because of their friendship and closeness, Buchon is actually Courbet and thus Courbet has placed the painter-beholder inside the painting. While Fried’s arguments about the beholder may need some more work, he has brought up some interesting issues about the beholder and how they are drawn into paintings.
Fried spends a considerable amount of time on the procession and its movement from left to right and back to the left. Fried looks at Courbet’s earlier works and notes Courbet’s tendency to use an S-shaped flow in his landscape paintings. Fried also shows us how Nadar’s Demenagement de l’Assemmblee constituante and Bertall’s Le Jubile des culottes de peau may have inspired Courbet’s procession. (I find these two examples the most intriguing part of this discussion.)
Getting to the main point of the article, Fried is concerned with the concept of the beholder and where exactly the beholder is situated in regards to the scene. For Fried, there are two beholders, the painter-beholder and the beholder tout court and both are part of the painting. Fried discusses at length the depiction of the grave and its location at the bottom of the painting. He suggests that one of the beholders is standing at the unseen side of the grave. Fried also discusses the outward glaze of the crufix-bearer, Colard, and suggests that Colard is staring out at another beholder. Fried goes on to suggest that the gaze is not returned by the beholder and instead is drawn to the hatless figure in profile behind and to the left of Colard. This figure has been identified as one of Courbet’s friends, Buchon. Fried then goes out on a limb and theorizes that because of their friendship and closeness, Buchon is actually Courbet and thus Courbet has placed the painter-beholder inside the painting. While Fried’s arguments about the beholder may need some more work, he has brought up some interesting issues about the beholder and how they are drawn into paintings.
Monday, October 29, 2007
Shape and Object
I enjoyed both of Fried’s essays on the experience and participation of the viewer in a work of art. What I did think was interesting and actually noticed right away, was that Fried picked monumental, larger than life size pieces of art in which to discuss the position of the viewer. As he points out in “Art and Objecthood,” the pieces are so big that there is no denying their presence. To me, this seems obvious. I think when a piece of art is large, it is easier to imagine yourself within or a part of because of its size. I would have liked to hear his take on the viewer within a smaller piece of art. It is however also interesting that the essays we were assigned to read questions the viewers place or role in a narrative, figurative painting and one in a simplistic, literalist sculpture with no apparent narrative or subject matter other that that of the experience of the viewer in relation to it. From what I can gather, and perhaps this may be too general, too simple, but the viewer is placed within and meant to experience both of these pieces. (Even though in Courbet’s “Burial” the artist is placing the viewer within a specific scene, I still think Fried’s conclusions are similar.) There did not seem to be a huge difference to me in Fried’s results and conclusion of the beholder, but rather the difference was in his analysis. Overall, I enjoyed his analysis from “Art and Objecthood” more than his essay on Courbet because the question of identity and what forms identity is once again evoked. Simply put, in Fried’s essay on Courbet he conveyed to me formal aspects of the painting that I hadn’t noticed before as well as the artist’s painting history leading up to the “Burial.” However, in “Art and Objecthood,” Fried brought up things that I hadn’t thought about before, or had thought about before, but took my thoughts in a different direction.
In Fried’s essay on Courbet, while I was relieved with his writing style in comparison to that of T.J. Clark, I was more interested in Fried’s introduction before his seemingly more formal analysis. Here he included socio-political theories made by Clark and other critics based on their analysis of “The Burial at Ornans” and it relationship, conveyance, and portrayal of the politics of rural France during the time in which Courbet was painting. I thought it was especially interesting that Clark mentioned that Courbet as an artist and a citizen would have had to choose what type of political person or ideal he was painting, meaning that there was a need to choose a side.
In Fried’s “Art and Objecthood,” I again began thinking about Valadon’s nudes and what shape’s their identity. (They are naked females, and according to Mulvey and Valadon, are meant to be perceived as more than a body. How do you convey something you cannot see especially when something physical and so blatant as a female nude is starring back?) Mulvey argued that Valadon’s nudes were subjects, individual and separate from the shape they took as nude females. Similarly, Fried questions the identity of painting and sculpture suggesting that in modern painting objects rely and are defined by the shape that they take. While in minimalist art, or literalist art as he refers to it, the shape is the object. I don’t know if Mulvey would agree with this because the “shape” in her article is a female nude, and that would mean if shape is object, then the subjects of Valadon’s painting are actually objects in that of female body. So, how does an artist convey more through art? Is there anyway that Valadon could have posed or painted her subjects differently in order to convey “a real, thinking woman” and still portray them nude? I think Valadon may be trying to get the viewer to look passed the body and see a woman, not the physical characteristics of a woman’s body that seems to dictate so much of how she is viewed and perceived, but instead the being that makes up the woman. (I must say however that if I had not read Mulvey’s article on Valadon’s nudes and came across one in a museum, I don’t know if I could read this much into it. At the most I might think that Valadon is trying to convey the body of a real woman, not necessarily the mind set. After all, in the end, I am still looking at a nude female. I would think the choice to portray a female nude is suppose to be the area of concentration.)
Now, I don’t know if Valadon’s nudes in comparison to a minimalist sculpture is a fair one in terms of object and shape, because the sculpture as Fried says does not have a precise subject matter, but is meant to be experienced by the viewer, while Valadon has a pretty specific subject matter in mind. However, for me the question is still there. Is shape and object the same? Does the physical become the first identifying factor, or is it possible to see past the shape before reading into and experiencing it?
In Fried’s essay on Courbet, while I was relieved with his writing style in comparison to that of T.J. Clark, I was more interested in Fried’s introduction before his seemingly more formal analysis. Here he included socio-political theories made by Clark and other critics based on their analysis of “The Burial at Ornans” and it relationship, conveyance, and portrayal of the politics of rural France during the time in which Courbet was painting. I thought it was especially interesting that Clark mentioned that Courbet as an artist and a citizen would have had to choose what type of political person or ideal he was painting, meaning that there was a need to choose a side.
In Fried’s “Art and Objecthood,” I again began thinking about Valadon’s nudes and what shape’s their identity. (They are naked females, and according to Mulvey and Valadon, are meant to be perceived as more than a body. How do you convey something you cannot see especially when something physical and so blatant as a female nude is starring back?) Mulvey argued that Valadon’s nudes were subjects, individual and separate from the shape they took as nude females. Similarly, Fried questions the identity of painting and sculpture suggesting that in modern painting objects rely and are defined by the shape that they take. While in minimalist art, or literalist art as he refers to it, the shape is the object. I don’t know if Mulvey would agree with this because the “shape” in her article is a female nude, and that would mean if shape is object, then the subjects of Valadon’s painting are actually objects in that of female body. So, how does an artist convey more through art? Is there anyway that Valadon could have posed or painted her subjects differently in order to convey “a real, thinking woman” and still portray them nude? I think Valadon may be trying to get the viewer to look passed the body and see a woman, not the physical characteristics of a woman’s body that seems to dictate so much of how she is viewed and perceived, but instead the being that makes up the woman. (I must say however that if I had not read Mulvey’s article on Valadon’s nudes and came across one in a museum, I don’t know if I could read this much into it. At the most I might think that Valadon is trying to convey the body of a real woman, not necessarily the mind set. After all, in the end, I am still looking at a nude female. I would think the choice to portray a female nude is suppose to be the area of concentration.)
Now, I don’t know if Valadon’s nudes in comparison to a minimalist sculpture is a fair one in terms of object and shape, because the sculpture as Fried says does not have a precise subject matter, but is meant to be experienced by the viewer, while Valadon has a pretty specific subject matter in mind. However, for me the question is still there. Is shape and object the same? Does the physical become the first identifying factor, or is it possible to see past the shape before reading into and experiencing it?
Sunday, October 28, 2007
Michael Fried and Courbet's Burial at Ornans
Michael Fried provides us with a new reading of Gustave Courbet’s The Burial at Ornans of 1849-50 using evidence presented by the image itself as the basis for his interpretation. He is concerned with what he describes as Courbet’s determination to create an “antitheatrical relationship” between the painting and its viewer (636). He then proceeds to refute what he characterizes as the 4 cruxes of previous readings of this painting: the additive mode of composition, the juxtaposition of discrete, self sufficient entities with no internal connection; 17th c. Dutch and Spanish painting as possible sources for the Burial; Baudelaire’s “Salon of 1846” as a connection to the black costumes of the rural bourgeoisie shown in the painting; and the painting as reflecting the social and political developments occurring at the time it was made. This refers to T. J. Clark’s emphasis on social, historical and political context in his book “Image of the People: Gustave Courbet and the 1848 Revolution.” Although Fried calls Clark’s work “the most original study of Courbet to appear in many years” (637), he says the political significance of Clark’s claims is modest. He also faults Clark for barely discussing the pictures themselves.
Fried’s own interpretation focuses on only a few of the elements of the painting: the serpentine path of the mourners, the skewed orientation of the open grave, and the exact location of Courbet’s friend Max Bouchon within the painting. Fried traces a history of possible alternative sources for the serpentine path citing Courbet’s early landscapes of the 1840’s showing the same terrain, and caricatures of processions of recognizable figures in Le Journal pour rire. In The Burial, Courbet uses the serpentine path to emphasize the lateral orientation of the procession of larger than life sized figures moving from left to right and left again across the broad expanse of the painting. They become compressed from 3-D to 2-D pushing toward the front of the picture plane. On the right, the bodies of 15 figures become a black mass differentiated only by their heads, hats and handkerchiefs. Also important to Fried’s argument are his speculations on Courbet’s treatment of the grave. He uses as a point of comparison Caravaggio’s Supper at Emmaus c. 1597 in which the gestures of the figures project into our space dissolving the boundary between the painting and the viewer, suggesting that both spaces are equally present to our senses. This plus the use of chiaroscuro heighten the dramatic effect of the painting. Fried calls this Baroque illusionism (661). It can be described as a theatrical effect. In opposition to this is Coubet’s treatment of the open grave at the bottom center of The Burial. It is treated with minimal illusionistic effect undermining the bottom framing edge and literally giving the viewer opposite the grave no ground on which to stand. Instead of projecting into the viewer’s space, the viewer is subsumed into the space of the painting. The viewer is not just an “eye” witnessing the illusion, he or she is drawn bodily into the image destroying the traditional notion of spectatorship. In addition to the lateral orientation of the procession of mourners described above, there is a vertical axis emphasized by the crucifix and the line of figures below it. The crucifix leads your eye to the man holding it, identified as the peasant Colard, who is staring out from the picture. Completing this vertical line is the dark haired boy holding a bucket. This boy’s red hat points to the yellow haired boy behind him and to his left. The second boy is looking up at the pallbearer to his left, whose hat, Fried suggests, has been jostled by the boy’s candle. Directly above the pallbearer’s dark hat is the head of Courbet’s friend Max Bouchon. So an acute angle leads your eye from the vertical axis to the head of Bouchon. Fried makes much of the significance of oblique angles in Courbet’s paintings.
Fried identifies two possible points of view outside of the painting. The first is directly opposite the open grave. He calls this (no) view, the view of the generalized viewer (Fried’s term is the beholder tout court.) A second position is implied by the skewed angle of the open grave. The fact that we can only see into the right side of the pit suggests this position is to the left of the open grave and Colard’s stare further pinpoints this position as directly in line with his intent gaze. Fried calls this the position of the painter/beholder, a specific viewer. Colard looks at the painter/beholder who deflects this gaze and looks at Bouchon instead. So the looking is not reciprocal. Fried conjectures that Bouchon is the beginning of the procession to the grave. If we imagine the painter/viewer, in this case Courbet, projecting himself bodily into the representation of Bouchon (with whom he identifies because of their friendship), then Courbet joins the procession at its source, enters the painting and obliterates his own spectatorship. Both Fried and T. J. Clark see Bouchon as a pivotal figure although T. J. Clark's interest is in Bouchon’s political views and not in where he was placed within the painting.
Fried says his views are based on conjecture, they may not be convincing, may contradict some of his earlier positions and may fail to answer some basic questions. Although I am not sure I agree with all of his arguments, they are thought provoking and open the discourse to new possibilities.
The readings we have done so far increase our understanding of Fried’s views. Even though Freud and Lacan are not mentioned directly, Fried describes ambivalences within Courbet’s painting, such as the merging of the artist into the painting and his resistance against this merging as a reaction formation, a Freudian term meaning the blocking of a desire by its opposite (See Introduction to Critical Theory http://www.cla.purdue.edu/English/Theory/psychoanalysis). His 2 nonreciprocal views of the cross bearer Colard staring out of the painting and the painter beholder avoiding that stare to look at Bouchon instead is reminiscent of Lacan’s eye and the gaze (“You never look at me from the place from which I see you”). The extreme strategy of Courbet projecting himself bodily into a painting can be seen as a social and political fact with Foucauldian implications (see note 55, p.677). It also exemplifies the phenomenological approach of Merleau Ponty in which the material world is experienced through the body and not just through the eye or the Cartesian mind. And instead of viewing T.J. Clark’s contextual approach and Fried’s more formalist methodology as antithetical to each other, Cixous, Butler, Bhabha and Munoz propose models where contradictions can be seen as complements coexisting simultaneously within a larger discourse.
Fried’s own interpretation focuses on only a few of the elements of the painting: the serpentine path of the mourners, the skewed orientation of the open grave, and the exact location of Courbet’s friend Max Bouchon within the painting. Fried traces a history of possible alternative sources for the serpentine path citing Courbet’s early landscapes of the 1840’s showing the same terrain, and caricatures of processions of recognizable figures in Le Journal pour rire. In The Burial, Courbet uses the serpentine path to emphasize the lateral orientation of the procession of larger than life sized figures moving from left to right and left again across the broad expanse of the painting. They become compressed from 3-D to 2-D pushing toward the front of the picture plane. On the right, the bodies of 15 figures become a black mass differentiated only by their heads, hats and handkerchiefs. Also important to Fried’s argument are his speculations on Courbet’s treatment of the grave. He uses as a point of comparison Caravaggio’s Supper at Emmaus c. 1597 in which the gestures of the figures project into our space dissolving the boundary between the painting and the viewer, suggesting that both spaces are equally present to our senses. This plus the use of chiaroscuro heighten the dramatic effect of the painting. Fried calls this Baroque illusionism (661). It can be described as a theatrical effect. In opposition to this is Coubet’s treatment of the open grave at the bottom center of The Burial. It is treated with minimal illusionistic effect undermining the bottom framing edge and literally giving the viewer opposite the grave no ground on which to stand. Instead of projecting into the viewer’s space, the viewer is subsumed into the space of the painting. The viewer is not just an “eye” witnessing the illusion, he or she is drawn bodily into the image destroying the traditional notion of spectatorship. In addition to the lateral orientation of the procession of mourners described above, there is a vertical axis emphasized by the crucifix and the line of figures below it. The crucifix leads your eye to the man holding it, identified as the peasant Colard, who is staring out from the picture. Completing this vertical line is the dark haired boy holding a bucket. This boy’s red hat points to the yellow haired boy behind him and to his left. The second boy is looking up at the pallbearer to his left, whose hat, Fried suggests, has been jostled by the boy’s candle. Directly above the pallbearer’s dark hat is the head of Courbet’s friend Max Bouchon. So an acute angle leads your eye from the vertical axis to the head of Bouchon. Fried makes much of the significance of oblique angles in Courbet’s paintings.
Fried identifies two possible points of view outside of the painting. The first is directly opposite the open grave. He calls this (no) view, the view of the generalized viewer (Fried’s term is the beholder tout court.) A second position is implied by the skewed angle of the open grave. The fact that we can only see into the right side of the pit suggests this position is to the left of the open grave and Colard’s stare further pinpoints this position as directly in line with his intent gaze. Fried calls this the position of the painter/beholder, a specific viewer. Colard looks at the painter/beholder who deflects this gaze and looks at Bouchon instead. So the looking is not reciprocal. Fried conjectures that Bouchon is the beginning of the procession to the grave. If we imagine the painter/viewer, in this case Courbet, projecting himself bodily into the representation of Bouchon (with whom he identifies because of their friendship), then Courbet joins the procession at its source, enters the painting and obliterates his own spectatorship. Both Fried and T. J. Clark see Bouchon as a pivotal figure although T. J. Clark's interest is in Bouchon’s political views and not in where he was placed within the painting.
Fried says his views are based on conjecture, they may not be convincing, may contradict some of his earlier positions and may fail to answer some basic questions. Although I am not sure I agree with all of his arguments, they are thought provoking and open the discourse to new possibilities.
The readings we have done so far increase our understanding of Fried’s views. Even though Freud and Lacan are not mentioned directly, Fried describes ambivalences within Courbet’s painting, such as the merging of the artist into the painting and his resistance against this merging as a reaction formation, a Freudian term meaning the blocking of a desire by its opposite (See Introduction to Critical Theory http://www.cla.purdue.edu/English/Theory/psychoanalysis). His 2 nonreciprocal views of the cross bearer Colard staring out of the painting and the painter beholder avoiding that stare to look at Bouchon instead is reminiscent of Lacan’s eye and the gaze (“You never look at me from the place from which I see you”). The extreme strategy of Courbet projecting himself bodily into a painting can be seen as a social and political fact with Foucauldian implications (see note 55, p.677). It also exemplifies the phenomenological approach of Merleau Ponty in which the material world is experienced through the body and not just through the eye or the Cartesian mind. And instead of viewing T.J. Clark’s contextual approach and Fried’s more formalist methodology as antithetical to each other, Cixous, Butler, Bhabha and Munoz propose models where contradictions can be seen as complements coexisting simultaneously within a larger discourse.
Friday, October 26, 2007
Angry White Man
I am disappointed that I missed the Munoz lecture because I find his article The White to Be Angry enlightening in the sense that the performance art of Vaginal Davis challenges and succumbs to the Marxist hegemony. As an offspring of an African American mother, Mexican American father, and the desire to live as white, Davis's disidentification serves to bring to light in the issues pertaining to the dominant ideologies that we live within today.
It appears that being gay and identified as a homosexual to sujected to the hegemonic viewpoints by the white, male-dominated society. By combining difference fragments of gender and race, Vaginal Davis (aka Clarence) becomes transforms not only from man into woman in drag but also from a black man to a white man. In essence, Dr. Davis brings to light the homophobia but also racial stereotypes of white people. Through the usage of humor and parody, Davis's performances is a terroristic attack on being masculine and white.
We see the disidentification and fragmention brought together in Davis's performance art actin "The White To Be Angry." Starting in the "Snow Period" in which Davis wants to associate himself/herself with the white militiamen in order to be associated with the hegemonic, ruling whiteness. By becoming Clarence, Davis is enraptured in an internal, subjective argument of being a white, masculine male vs. beings a gay, black and highly feminite drag queen. Also, I find it internesting that Dr. Davis does not because to aesthetically seductive in her transformation as womanly. Instead by costuming in minimalist fashion and makeup, Davis brings to light the abjected way of seeing and thinking about woman in how our dominant ideologies presupposes its mentality of what a woman should like like. Henceforth, subjecting what a woman should look like in the imago.
In the second part of the reading, Munoz reflects on Mark Simpson's book Anti-Gay which attempts to disassociate the hegemonic thinkings of homosexuality. Instead of Gay Pride Day, Simpson wants an Anti-Gay Pride Day which disavows the dominant thinkings how gayness. It appears that Simpon is trying to deconstruct the societal forces that has constructness the definition of what gay is. And this is a similar issue we saw in the Judith Butler article on feminism. In Foucaltian fashion, it appears that the description and identity of homosexuality is not determined by the communitiy of these labeled people but by the dominant people who are not ingrained or comfortable with these so-called alternative lifestyles.
I find the readings on Feminism and Gender & Race to be the most enlightening thus far for me because it disengages me from the ideologies brought forth in a white male dominated world. If I have learned anything thus far, it is that difference can be associated in how we read art and the signs it brings forth. Whether it is look at the performance art of a homosexual, terrroristic drag queen, an Impressionist painting by Monet, or a Puritantical Ansel Adams photograph, it has become tremendously important for me to understand the ideologies that have shaped the artist's work but the life of the work itself within a society that is so complex in terms of difference. And all of these differences are important and could be used to analyze any artwork regardleess of gender, race, and sexual preferences.
It appears that being gay and identified as a homosexual to sujected to the hegemonic viewpoints by the white, male-dominated society. By combining difference fragments of gender and race, Vaginal Davis (aka Clarence) becomes transforms not only from man into woman in drag but also from a black man to a white man. In essence, Dr. Davis brings to light the homophobia but also racial stereotypes of white people. Through the usage of humor and parody, Davis's performances is a terroristic attack on being masculine and white.
We see the disidentification and fragmention brought together in Davis's performance art actin "The White To Be Angry." Starting in the "Snow Period" in which Davis wants to associate himself/herself with the white militiamen in order to be associated with the hegemonic, ruling whiteness. By becoming Clarence, Davis is enraptured in an internal, subjective argument of being a white, masculine male vs. beings a gay, black and highly feminite drag queen. Also, I find it internesting that Dr. Davis does not because to aesthetically seductive in her transformation as womanly. Instead by costuming in minimalist fashion and makeup, Davis brings to light the abjected way of seeing and thinking about woman in how our dominant ideologies presupposes its mentality of what a woman should like like. Henceforth, subjecting what a woman should look like in the imago.
In the second part of the reading, Munoz reflects on Mark Simpson's book Anti-Gay which attempts to disassociate the hegemonic thinkings of homosexuality. Instead of Gay Pride Day, Simpson wants an Anti-Gay Pride Day which disavows the dominant thinkings how gayness. It appears that Simpon is trying to deconstruct the societal forces that has constructness the definition of what gay is. And this is a similar issue we saw in the Judith Butler article on feminism. In Foucaltian fashion, it appears that the description and identity of homosexuality is not determined by the communitiy of these labeled people but by the dominant people who are not ingrained or comfortable with these so-called alternative lifestyles.
I find the readings on Feminism and Gender & Race to be the most enlightening thus far for me because it disengages me from the ideologies brought forth in a white male dominated world. If I have learned anything thus far, it is that difference can be associated in how we read art and the signs it brings forth. Whether it is look at the performance art of a homosexual, terrroristic drag queen, an Impressionist painting by Monet, or a Puritantical Ansel Adams photograph, it has become tremendously important for me to understand the ideologies that have shaped the artist's work but the life of the work itself within a society that is so complex in terms of difference. And all of these differences are important and could be used to analyze any artwork regardleess of gender, race, and sexual preferences.
Tuesday, October 23, 2007
Vaginal Davis' Terrorist Drag
In Jose Estaban Munoz's article "The White to be Angry" he discusses the complexities of a gay indivudual identifying with dominant ideologies. He begins by saying that most individuals of a minority, whether it be racial or sexual, are faced with the decision of subscribing to a dominant ideology. And that when the individual does accept a dominant ideology they are denying a part of themself. He goes on to talk about Davis who is a drag queen performer. She uses her perfomances to "rehearse identities" that are not socially accepted with the intent of restructuring the image of the self and the social.
Munoz discusses the periods that Davis goes through in her life as a minority. She goes through what she call the "snow period" where she wishes that she were white or had a relationship with a white person so that she would feel validated or validated through association. The next stage experienced is counteridentification with the dominant culture in which she turns to her own community after being exposed to white culture.
Davis uses her drag performances not to "change the ideas of the spectators, but in order to trouble them, to stir up uncertain desire zones that they always more or less refuse to explore. The question is...to make bodies, all bodies, break away from the representations and restraints on the 'social body'". In this way Davis uses art (performances) not as a way to necessarily convey a idea, but as a way to compel viewers to rethink the ideas they already have.
Munoz discusses the periods that Davis goes through in her life as a minority. She goes through what she call the "snow period" where she wishes that she were white or had a relationship with a white person so that she would feel validated or validated through association. The next stage experienced is counteridentification with the dominant culture in which she turns to her own community after being exposed to white culture.
Davis uses her drag performances not to "change the ideas of the spectators, but in order to trouble them, to stir up uncertain desire zones that they always more or less refuse to explore. The question is...to make bodies, all bodies, break away from the representations and restraints on the 'social body'". In this way Davis uses art (performances) not as a way to necessarily convey a idea, but as a way to compel viewers to rethink the ideas they already have.
Class and theory
How does theory and art history work with one another? Yes, I understand that there is theory in everything we do. However, I have come to the point where it is blurring the line a little. After many of these reading I sometimes wonder what does this have to do with art? I understand the methodologies and there relationship with art history.
After reading this last article I began to understand how and why we have the methodology of class and representation in art history. I also understood the meaning be hind class and art and social class and theory. I thought that it was interesting that people would link the two and make a huge debate about this subject matter. One question that I have is how and why we use this and also why don’t we use this more. I find when looking at art history texts that social relations and art history go hand in hand. I agree with Jenny that TJ Clark now make sense with his article that we read.
The article that we read this week talks about the social class and different types of social class that could get along or they don’t. When I began to read this article I was totally confused by the title and again what did it have to do with art history. It was not until that I read it for the seconded time that I got it and it made complete since. It was like a light bulb went off and I got it. I love the art that goes with the text and it make complete understanding of how and why we need social class structure and what it does with art.
I look forward to talking with you all about this topic.
After reading this last article I began to understand how and why we have the methodology of class and representation in art history. I also understood the meaning be hind class and art and social class and theory. I thought that it was interesting that people would link the two and make a huge debate about this subject matter. One question that I have is how and why we use this and also why don’t we use this more. I find when looking at art history texts that social relations and art history go hand in hand. I agree with Jenny that TJ Clark now make sense with his article that we read.
The article that we read this week talks about the social class and different types of social class that could get along or they don’t. When I began to read this article I was totally confused by the title and again what did it have to do with art history. It was not until that I read it for the seconded time that I got it and it made complete since. It was like a light bulb went off and I got it. I love the art that goes with the text and it make complete understanding of how and why we need social class structure and what it does with art.
I look forward to talking with you all about this topic.
Monday, October 22, 2007
Realization: I Think I Like It. . .
This article really got me thinking about class and theory. It is a relationship that I've been trying to make sense out of ever since we read T.J. Clark's essay a few weeks ago on where the subject of class was mentioned in relationship to Abstract Expressionism. It was an unexpected hit for me, so to speak, as I never thought of class in relation to art, other than if the subject of the painting was obviously representative of or targeted a specific class. And then theory- I've been trying to figure out its relationship to art and my own viewing and interpretation of art. I didn't think it would have as great of an impact as it has so far, and think it will even more as I start reading and understanding more. It has in a way, changed the way I think and look at art- I think in a good way.
So, how has the Vaginal Creme Davis article helped me figure out a small part of the relationship between class and theory? In the articles and excerpts we have read so far, there is the constant reference to social class. This article was no different. So now, more than ever, I wondered why? There was something I wasn't getting, something that wasn't clicking. Since the beginning, I've been trying to figure what our theory readings have to do with art. Even in the articles where critics have used theory in writing about art, I did not see the relationship. I felt so removed from the actual piece of art that sparked the discussion in the first place. So, in the beginning I saw theory as another way to interpret and derive meaning from art; a new way of looking and thinking about art. And, I still think this. But, as I kept reading this particular article, I couldn't help but wonder if theory in some way helps legitimize art, especially some modern and contemporary art that is thought by some critics as "un-avant-garde?" There are some pieces of art, especially contemporary art, that I even look at and wonder, "How is that art? What makes it special; beautiful?" And, now I think it is in the provoking of thought and the awareness about certain issues that make them art. There was something incomplete about how I used to look art. Using theory, even just reading theory has helped me come to this conclusion, and of course Vaginal Davis.
Vaginal Davis reminded me of a paper I wrote on Judy Chicago's "Dinner Party" and how it was often referred to as "kitsch." Similarly to Chicago's "Dinner Party," I don't think Vaginal Davis is given enough credit by some critics in her ability to convey political and gender awareness and ideology through art. If art according to some critics is only suppose to be aesthetically beautiful and painted, then I think they are in some ways missing the boat. Often, especially with Chicago and Vaginal Davis, artwork becomes a symbol for something else that the artist is trying to convey. And, like a poet or musician conveys thoughts and ideas through words, artists do it visually. So, what makes art so powerful in its conveying of ideas? I think it is because art is visual. It is a personal expression like poetry and music, yes, but there is no denying its visual presence. The art is right in front of you- yours for the taking. Language is not an issue for art. It is accessible to all, and interpretation is possible for all. I think it is partly this accessibility that helps make art so powerful.
I know theory is not for everyone. The readings frustrate me no end. I'm looking up words in the dictionary every five minutes and then going back and reading the articles again and again. But, when I'm finished I feel so satisfied and intellectually stimulated. This sensation and sense of accomplishment is kind of like Roland Barthes, "The Pleasure Text." This class has really given me a new way of looking at art, and while this blog is not solely on Munoz or Vaginal Davis, this was the article that clicked theory for me, I think. It didn't click it quite as I hoped it would in terms of my complete understanding of theory, but I understand its importance and relation to art. I think I like it. . .
So, how has the Vaginal Creme Davis article helped me figure out a small part of the relationship between class and theory? In the articles and excerpts we have read so far, there is the constant reference to social class. This article was no different. So now, more than ever, I wondered why? There was something I wasn't getting, something that wasn't clicking. Since the beginning, I've been trying to figure what our theory readings have to do with art. Even in the articles where critics have used theory in writing about art, I did not see the relationship. I felt so removed from the actual piece of art that sparked the discussion in the first place. So, in the beginning I saw theory as another way to interpret and derive meaning from art; a new way of looking and thinking about art. And, I still think this. But, as I kept reading this particular article, I couldn't help but wonder if theory in some way helps legitimize art, especially some modern and contemporary art that is thought by some critics as "un-avant-garde?" There are some pieces of art, especially contemporary art, that I even look at and wonder, "How is that art? What makes it special; beautiful?" And, now I think it is in the provoking of thought and the awareness about certain issues that make them art. There was something incomplete about how I used to look art. Using theory, even just reading theory has helped me come to this conclusion, and of course Vaginal Davis.
Vaginal Davis reminded me of a paper I wrote on Judy Chicago's "Dinner Party" and how it was often referred to as "kitsch." Similarly to Chicago's "Dinner Party," I don't think Vaginal Davis is given enough credit by some critics in her ability to convey political and gender awareness and ideology through art. If art according to some critics is only suppose to be aesthetically beautiful and painted, then I think they are in some ways missing the boat. Often, especially with Chicago and Vaginal Davis, artwork becomes a symbol for something else that the artist is trying to convey. And, like a poet or musician conveys thoughts and ideas through words, artists do it visually. So, what makes art so powerful in its conveying of ideas? I think it is because art is visual. It is a personal expression like poetry and music, yes, but there is no denying its visual presence. The art is right in front of you- yours for the taking. Language is not an issue for art. It is accessible to all, and interpretation is possible for all. I think it is partly this accessibility that helps make art so powerful.
I know theory is not for everyone. The readings frustrate me no end. I'm looking up words in the dictionary every five minutes and then going back and reading the articles again and again. But, when I'm finished I feel so satisfied and intellectually stimulated. This sensation and sense of accomplishment is kind of like Roland Barthes, "The Pleasure Text." This class has really given me a new way of looking at art, and while this blog is not solely on Munoz or Vaginal Davis, this was the article that clicked theory for me, I think. It didn't click it quite as I hoped it would in terms of my complete understanding of theory, but I understand its importance and relation to art. I think I like it. . .
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